The US Hand in Libya’s Tragedy


The US Hand in Libya’s Tragedy

usa-libya-flag

The mainstream U.S. news media is lambasting the Europeans for failing to stop the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Mediterranean Sea as desperate Libyans flee their war-torn country in overloaded boats that are sinking as hundreds drown. But the MSM forgets how this Libyan crisis began, including its own key role along with that of “liberal interventionists” such as Hillary Clinton and Samantha Power.

In 2011, it was all the rage in Official Washington to boast about the noble “responsibility to protect” the people of eastern Libya who supposedly were threatened with extermination by the “mad man” Muammar Gaddafi. We also were told endlessly that, back in 1988, Gaddafi’s agents had blown Pan Am 103 out of the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland.

The R2Pers, led by then-National Security Council aide Power with the backing of Secretary of State Clinton, convinced President Barack Obama that a “humanitarian intervention” was needed to prevent Gaddafi from slaughtering people whom he claimed were Islamic terrorists.

As this U.S.-orchestrated bombing campaign was about to begin in late March 2011, Power told a New York City audience that the failure to act would have been “extremely chilling, deadly and indeed a stain on our collective conscience.” Power was credited with steeling Obama’s spine to press ahead with the military operation.

Under a United Nations resolution, the intervention was supposed to be limited to establishing no-fly zones to prevent the slaughter of civilians. But the operation quickly morphed into a “regime change” war with the NATO-led bombing devastating Gaddafi’s soldiers who were blown to bits when caught on desert roadways.

Yet, the biggest concern in Official Washington was a quote from an Obama’s aide that the President was “leading from behind” – with European warplanes out front in the air war – when America’s war hawks said the United States should be leading from the front.

At the time, there were a few of us who raised red flags about the Libyan war “group think.” Though no one felt much sympathy for Gaddafi, he wasn’t wrong when he warned that Islamic terrorists were transforming the Benghazi region into a stronghold. Yes, his rhetoric about exterminating rats was over the top, but there was a real danger from these extremists.

And, the Pan Am 103 case, which was repeatedly cited as the indisputable proof of Gaddafi’s depravity, likely was falsely pinned on Libya. Anyone who dispassionately examined the 2001 conviction of Libyan agent Ali al-Megrahi by a special Scottish court would realize that the case was based on highly dubious evidence and bought-and-paid-for testimony.

Megrahi was put away more as a political compromise (with a Libyan co-defendant acquitted) than because his guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, by 2009, the conviction was falling apart. Even a Scottish appeals court expressed concern about a grave miscarriage of justice. But Megrahi’s appeal was short-circuited by his release to Libya on compassionate grounds because he was suffering from terminal prostate cancer.

Yet the U.S. mainstream media routinely called him “the Lockerbie bomber” and noted that the Libyan government had taken “responsibility” for the bombing, which was true but only because it was the only way to get punitive sanctions lifted. The government, like Megrahi, continued to proclaim innocence.

A Smirking MSM

During those heady days of bombing Libya in 2011, it also was common for the MSM to smirk at the notion that Megrahi was truly suffering from advanced prostate cancer since he hadn’t died as quickly as some doctors thought he might. Then, in September 2011, after Gaddafi’s regime fell, Megrahi’s family invited the BBC and other news organizations to see Megrahi struggling to breathe in his sick bed.

His son, Khaled al-Megrahi, said, “I know my father is innocent and one day his innocence will come out.” Asked about the people who died in the Pan Am bombing, the son said: “We feel sorry about all the people who died. We want to know who did this bad thing. We want to know the truth as well.”

But it was only after Megrahi died on May 20, 2012, that some elements of the MSM acknowledged grudgingly that they were aware of the many doubts about his conviction all along. The New York Times’ obituary carried a detailed account of the evidentiary gaps that were ignored both during the trial in 2001 and during the bombing of Libya in 2011.

The Times noted that “even some world leaders” saw Megrahi

“as a victim of injustice whose trial, 12 years after the bombing, had been riddled with political overtones, memory gaps and flawed evidence. … Investigators, while they had no direct proof, believed that the suitcase with the bomb had been fitted with routing tags for baggage handlers, put on a plane at Malta and flown to Frankfurt, where it was loaded onto a Boeing 727 feeder flight that connected to Flight 103 at London, then transferred to the doomed jetliner.”

Besides the lack of proof supporting that hypothesis was the sheer implausibility that a terrorist would assume that an unattended suitcase could make such an unlikely trip without being detected, especially when it would have been much easier to sneak the suitcase with the bomb onto Pan Am 103 through the lax security at Heathrow Airport outside London.

The Times’ obit also noted that during the 85-day trial,

“None of the witnesses connected the suspects directly to the bomb. But one, Tony Gauci, the Maltese shopkeeper who sold the clothing that forensic experts had linked to the bomb, identified Mr. Megrahi as the buyer, although Mr. Gauci seemed doubtful and had picked others in photo displays. …

“The bomb’s timer was traced to a Zurich manufacturer, Mebo, whose owner, Edwin Bollier, testified that such devices had been sold to Libya. A fragment from the crash site was identified by a Mebo employee, Ulrich Lumpert. Neither defendant testified. But a turncoat Libyan agent testified that plastic explosives had been stored in [Megrahi’s co-defendant’s] desk in Malta, that Mr. Megrahi had brought a brown suitcase, and that both men were at the Malta airport on the day the bomb was sent on its way.”

In finding Megrahi guilty, the Scottish court admitted that the case was “circumstantial, the evidence incomplete and some witnesses unreliable,” but concluded that “there is nothing in the evidence which leaves us with any reasonable doubt as to the guilt” of Megrahi.

However, the evidence later came under increasing doubt. The Times wrote: “It emerged that Mr. Gauci had repeatedly failed to identify Mr. Megrahi before the trial and had selected him only after seeing his photograph in a magazine and being shown the same photo in court. The date of the clothing sale was also in doubt.” Scottish authorities learned, too, that the U.S. Justice Department paid Gauci $2 million for his testimony.

As for the bomb’s timer, the Times noted that the court called Bollier “untruthful and unreliable” and “In 2007, Mr. Lumpert admitted that he had lied at the trial, stolen a timer and given it to a Lockerbie investigator. Moreover, the fragment he identified was never tested for residue of explosives, although it was the only evidence of possible Libyan involvement.

“The court’s inference that the bomb had been transferred from the Frankfurt feeder flight was also cast into doubt when a Heathrow security guard revealed that Pan Am’s baggage area had been broken into 17 hours before the bombing, a circumstance never explored. Hans Köchler, a United Nations observer, called the trial ‘a spectacular miscarriage of justice,’ words echoed by [South African President Nelson] Mandela.”

In other words, Megrahi’s conviction looked to have been a case of gross prosecutorial misconduct, relying on testimony from perjurers and failing to pursue promising leads (like the possibility that the bomb was introduced at Heathrow, not transferred from plane to plane to plane). And those problems were known prior to Megrahi’s return to Libya in 2009 and prior to the U.S.-supported air war against Gaddafi in 2011.

Yet, Andrea Mitchell at MSNBC and pretty much everyone else in the MSM repeated endlessly that Megrahi was “the Lockerbie bomber” and that Libya was responsible for the atrocity, thus further justifying the “humanitarian intervention” that slaughtered Gaddafi’s soldiers and enabled rebel militias to capture Tripoli in summer 2011.

Al-Qaeda Hotbed

Similarly, there was scant U.S. media attention given to evidence that eastern Libya, the heart of the anti-Gaddafi rebellion, indeed was a hotbed for Islamic militancy, with that region supplying the most per-capita militants fighting U.S. troops in Iraq, often under the banner of Al-Qaeda.

Despite that evidence, Gaddafi’s claim that he was battling Islamic terrorists in the Benghazi region was mocked or ignored. It didn’t even matter that his claim was corroborated by a report from U.S. analysts Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman for West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.

In their report, “Al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq,” Felter and Fishman analyzed Al-Qaeda documents captured in 2007 showing personnel records of militants who flocked to Iraq for the war against the Americans. The documents showed eastern Libya providing a surprising number of suicide bombers who traveled to Iraq to kill American troops.

Felter and Fishman wrote that these so-called Sinjar Records disclosed that while Saudis comprised the largest number of foreign fighters in Iraq, Libyans represented the largest per-capita contingent by far. Those Libyans came overwhelmingly from towns and cities in the east.

“The vast majority of Libyan fighters that included their hometown in the Sinjar Records resided in the country’s Northeast, particularly the coastal cities of Darnah 60.2% (53) and Benghazi 23.9% (21),” Felter and Fishman wrote, adding that Abu Layth al‐Libi, Emir of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), “reinforced Benghazi and Darnah’s importance to Libyan jihadis in his announcement that LIFG had joined al‐Qa’ida.”

Some important Al-Qaeda leaders operating in Pakistan’s tribal regions also were believed to have come from Libya. For instance, “Atiyah,” who was guiding the anti-U.S. war strategy in Iraq, was identified as a Libyan named Atiyah Abd al-Rahman.

It was Atiyah who urged a strategy of creating a quagmire for U.S. forces in Iraq, buying time for Al-Qaeda Central to rebuild its strength in Pakistan. “Prolonging the war [in Iraq] is in our interest,” Atiyah said in a letter that upbraided Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi for his hasty and reckless actions in Iraq.

After U.S. Special Forces killed Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, in Pakistan, Atiyah became al-Qaeda’s second in command until he himself was reportedly killed in a U.S. drone strike in August 2011. [See Consortiumnews.com “Time Finally Ran Out for Atiyah.”]

However, to most Americans who rely on the major U.S. news media, little of this was known, as the Washington Post itself acknowledged in an article on Sept. 12, 2011, after Gaddafi had been overthrown but before his murder. In an article on the rise of Islamists inside the new power structure in Libya, the Post wrote:

“Although it went largely unnoticed during the uprising that toppled Gaddafi last month, Islamists were at the heart of the fight, many as rebel commanders. Now some are clashing with secularists within the rebels’ Transitional National Council, prompting worries among some liberals that the Islamists — who still command the bulk of fighters and weapons — could use their strength to assert an even more dominant role.”

On Sept. 15, 2011, the New York Times published a similar article, entitled “Islamists’ Growing Sway Raises Questions for Libya.” It began:

“In the emerging post-Qaddafi Libya, the most influential politician may well be Ali Sallabi, who has no formal title but commands broad respect as an Islamic scholar and populist orator who was instrumental in leading the mass uprising. The most powerful military leader is now Abdel Hakim Belhaj, the former leader of a hard-line group once believed to be aligned with Al Qaeda.”

Belhaj was previously the commander of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which was associated with Al-Qaeda in the past, maintained training bases in Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks, and was listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.

Belhaj and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group denied continued allegiance to Al-Qaeda, but Belhaj was captured during George W. Bush’s post-9/11 “war on terror” and was harshly interrogated by the CIA at a “black site” prison in Thailand before being handed over to Gaddafi’s government which imprisoned and – Belhaj claims – tortured him.

The Times reported that “Belhaj has become so much an insider lately that he is seeking to unseat Mahmoud Jabril, the American-trained economist who is the nominal prime minister of the interim government, after Mr. Jibril obliquely criticized the Islamists.”

The Times article by correspondents Rod Nordland and David D. Kirkpatrick also cited other signs of growing Islamist influence inside the Libyan rebel movement:

“Islamist militias in Libya receive weapons and financing directly from foreign benefactors like Qatar; a Muslim Brotherhood figure, Abel al-Rajazk Abu Hajar, leads the Tripoli Municipal Governing Council, where Islamists are reportedly in the majority.”

It may be commendable that the Post and Times finally gave serious attention to this consequence of the NATO-backed “regime change” in Libya, but the fact that these premier American newspapers ignored the Islamist issue as well as doubts about Libya’s Lockerbie guilt – while the U.S. government was whipping up public support for another war in the Muslim world – raises questions about whether those news organizations primarily serve a propaganda function.

Gaddafi’s Brutal Demise

Even amid these warning signs that Libya was headed toward bloody anarchy, the excited MSM coverage of Libya remained mostly about the manhunt for “the madman” – Muammar Gaddafi. When rebels finally captured Gaddafi on Oct. 20, 2011, in the town of Sirte – and sodomized him with a knife before killing him – Secretary of State Clinton could barely contain her glee, joking in one interview: “We came, we saw, he died.”

The months of aerial slaughter of Gaddafi’s soldiers and Gaddafi’s own gruesome death seemed less amusing on Sept. 11, 2012, when Islamic terrorists overran the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, killing U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. diplomatic personnel. In the two-plus years since, Libya has become a killing ground for rival militias, including some now affiliated with the Islamic State.

As the BBC reported on Feb. 24, 2015, the Islamic State

“has gained a foothold in key towns and cities in the mostly lawless North African state [Libya], prompting Egypt – seeing itself as the bulwark against Islamists in region – to launch air strikes against the group. …

IS has launched its most high-profile attacks in Libya, bombing an upmarket hotel in the capital, Tripoli, in January, and releasing a video earlier this month showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians it had kidnapped. On 20 February, it killed at least 40 people in a suicide bombing in the eastern town of al-Qubbah.”

Now, the chaos that the U.S.-sponsored “regime change” unleashed has grown so horrific that it is causing desperate Libyans to climb into unseaworthy boats to escape the sharp edges of the Islamic State’s knives and other depredations resulting from the nationwide anarchy.

Thus, Libya should be a powerful lesson to Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power and the other R2Pers that often their schemes of armed “humanitarianism” can go badly awry and do much more harm than good. It should also be another reminder to the MSM to question the arguments presented by the U.S. government, rather than simply repeating those dubious claims and false narratives.

But neither seems to be happening. The “liberal interventionists” – like their neoconservative allies – remain unchastened, still pumping for more “regime change” wars, such as in Syria. Yet, many of these moral purists are silent about the slaughter of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Palestinians in Gaza, or now Houthis and other Yemenis dying under Saudi bombs in Yemen.

It appears the well-placed R2Pers in the Obama administration are selective in where that “responsibility to protect” applies.

Samantha Power, now serving as U.S. ambassador to the UN, remains the same self-righteous scold denouncing human rights abuses in places where there are American-designated “bad guys” while looking the other way in places where the killing is being done by U.S. “allies.” As for Hillary Clinton, she is already being touted as the presumptive Democratic nominee for President.

Meanwhile, the MSM has conveniently forgotten its own propaganda role in revving up the war on Libya in 2011. So, instead of self-reflection and self-criticism, the mainstream U.S. media is filled with condemnations of the Europeans for their failure to respond properly to the crisis of some 900 Libyans apparently drowning in a desperate attempt to flee their disintegrating country.

When the truth will out There may be more to Benghazi than officialdom wants to uncover


When the truth will out There may be more to Benghazi than officialdom wants to uncover

What if American Weapons Killed in Benghazi Illustration by Greg Groesch

What if American Weapons Killed in Benghazi Illustration by Greg Groesch

It took four whole years for Washington Times to realise the obvious, we have been shouting on deaf ears for the last four and half years.

Of-course we are not so prominent journalists we are plain people who fight with what ever means we have against the Western media either by blogging, or twitting, or Facebook, or YouTube which ever means available risking prosecution from the militias and gangs who do not like what we say….. If anyone of you readers have been following me since August 2011 you will see that what Andrew Napolitano is writing here below we have said it over and over but no one listened or if they did they are taking our articles and owning them without giving any credit to all Libyan brothers and sisters who have stopped everything in their lives and are working without pay to try to get the truth out….All bloggers and I, do not need their recognition or their congratulation the only thing I can say better late than never……

These internet-newspapers are the same who sold you the war in Libya and Syria! They are the ones who have blood on their hands for having millions killed in Libya and Syria, they are the ones who I hold responsible for Libyans and Syrians that have become refugees. They are the same people who wrote that Qaddafi and Assad are dictators and they must go…. They are the ones responsible that Qaddafi was BRUTALLY MURDERED and made viral the video of his EXECUTION.

It’s not only the American foreign policy or the Cabal mafia who are responsible but also the WESTERN MEDIA which are the LAP DOGS of their own government. They should not be called JOURNALISTS but CRIMINALS FOR HIRE AND SHOULD BE PROSECUTED THE SAME AS MASS MURDERERS.

As for the Benghazi Committee their only goal is to clear the CIA and nothing else… they do not want the REAL truth… every single one in the Benghazi Committee have their own agenda and the TRUTH IS NOT ONE OF THEM.

As for Russia and China they are paying a high price for not Vetoing the no flight zone in Libya… 

Qaddafi said in his last speech that LIBYA WILL BE THE DEATH OF THE WEST… AND HIS PROPHECY IS BECOMING A REALITY….  LIBYA WILL SURVIVE… LIBYA WILL WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE WESTERN COLONIZATION… LIBYA WILL BE ONCE AGAIN FREE

 

By Andrew P. Napolitano – June 17, 2015

What if President Obama secretly agreed with others in the government in 2011 to provide arms to rebels in Libya and Syria? What if the scheme called for American arms merchants to sell serious American military hardware to the government of Qatar, which would and did transfer it to rebel groups? What if the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of the Treasury approved those sales?
What if the approvals were kept secret because some of those rebel groups were characterized by the same Departments of State and Treasury as terrorist organizations? What if the ultimate recipients of those arms were the militants and monsters in al Qaeda and ISIS who have slain and tortured innocents?
What if this scheme is defined in federal law as providing material assistance to terrorist organizations? What if that’s a felony? What if that’s the same felony for which the U.S. Department of Justice has prosecuted dozens of persons merely for attempting? What if this scheme was not a mere attempt, but an actual arming of terrorists?
What if this scheme was approved not only by the president, but also by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton? What if the idea of doing this was hers? What if congressional leaders in both houses of Congress and from both parties signed off on this? What if the remaining members of Congress and the American people were kept in the dark about this scheme? What if those who agreed to permit this scheme knew that the arms were destined for terrorist organizations and they were flirting with a criminal conspiracy to violate federal law?
What if Mrs. Clinton was asked by senators while under oath about the delivery of arms made by American manufacturers to ports in the Middle East and she denied knowing anything about it? What if she knew she had personally approved the deliveries but falsely claimed she had no knowledge?
What if this arms-to-terrorists scheme began to unravel? What if the rebels were really bad guys? What if there are many rebel-terrorist groups with varying degrees of hatred for the United States? What if some of the groups that received American arms are so hateful of the United States that they will bite the hands that fed them?

What if Clinton’s job was to prevent American arms from slipping into the hands of terrorists? What if she secretly did the opposite of what her job required? What if she and the president and the other conspirators viewed themselves as being above the law? What if they thought the terrorist groups they were arming would overthrow the Gadhafi government in Libya and the Assad government in Syria? What if they believed those revolutions would be greeted with cheers in the West? What if they hoped the cheers would be for them?
What if their goal of regime change succeeded in Libya, and yet the result was chaos? What if under Col. Moammar Gadhafi, Libya had been a stable U.S. ally? What if today there is no central government in Libya and it is ruled by gangs and tribes and militias?
What if the American assistance to Syrian rebels became known to the Russians? What if that knowledge prompted Russian President Putin to help his ally, President Bashar Assad of Syria? What if the American and Russian introduction of heavy military hardware into the Syrian civil war has resulted in prolonged war and more deaths of innocents and destruction of property, not less?
What if one of the terrorist groups that received American arms from this scheme attacked the American consulate in Benghazi, because it wanted more arms from the United States and it knew arms were stored there? What if that attack killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens and three of his colleagues? What if this was a nightmare scenario for the conspirators? What if the conspirators now fear that the truth of their plot will become known?
What if the tragedy at Benghazi was unwelcome but not unforeseen? What if the conspirators knew of the risks to innocent lives attendant upon breaking the law by giving arms to madmen? What if members of Congress who were kept in the dark about the arms-to-terrorists scheme were outraged over Benghazi? What if leaders of the House of Representatives, some of whom were conspirators, formed a committee to investigate how the murder of Stevens came about?
What if some members of that committee already know that Stevens and the others were murdered with U.S. weapons illegally given to U.S. enemies secretly by U.S. government officials? What if the stated purpose of the committee — to seek the truth about Benghazi — is not the true purpose? What if the real purpose of that committee is to suppress the truth so that the president and Mrs. Clinton and the other conspirators do not get indicted? What if the truth is the last thing the conspirators want to see come out?
What do we do about lawless government by secrecy? What do we do about government officials who act as if they are above the law? What do we do if one of them lives in the White House and controls all federal prosecutions? What do we do if another of them is presently on her way there?

Investigative Project on Terrorism “THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD”


Investigative Project on Terrorism
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Introduction:

The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun)¹ was founded as an Islamic revivalist
movement in the Egyptian town of Isma’iliyaa in March 1928 by school teacher Hassan
al-Banna (1906-1949)²

The Brotherhood’s goal has been to promote the implementation of Shari’ah (Islamic law
derived from the Quran and the Sunnah)³ Early in its history, the Brotherhood focused
on education and charity. It soon became heavily involved in politics and remains a major
player on the Egyptian political scene, despite the fact that it is an illegal organization.

The movement has grown exponentially, from only 800 members in 1936, to over 2
million in 1948, to its current position as a pervasive international Sunni Islamist
movement, with covert and overt branches in over 70 countries.

“I did not want to enter into competition with the other orders,” al-Banna once said. “And
I did not want it to be confined to one group of Muslims or one aspect of Islamic reform;
rather I sought that it be a general message based on learning, education, and jihad.4
According to al-Banna, “It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to
impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet.5 That helps
explain the Muslim Brotherhood’s motto: “Allah ghayatuna Al-rasul za’imuna. Al-Qur-
‘an dusturuna. Al-jihad sabiluna. Al-mawt fi sabil Allah asma amanina. Allah akbar,
Allah akbar.” (“God is our goal, the Quran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader,
struggle [jihad] is our way, and death in the service of God is the loftiest of our wishes.
God is great. God is great.”)6 *****(that has nothing to do with the Quran but his twisted psychopathic way of thinking)

The Brotherhood has reached global status, wielding power and influence in almost every
state with a Muslim population. Additionally, the Brotherhood maintains political parties
in many Middle-Eastern and African countries, including Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia,
Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and even Israel.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood attempted to overthrow the Syrian government in the 1980s, but the
revolt was crushed. Aside from the Muslim Brotherhood in Israel proper, the terrorist
organization Hamas was founded as the Palestinian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood.
In fact, Article II of the Hamas charter states:

1. They are also known as the Muslim Brothers, The Brothers (al-Ikhwan), or the Society of Muslim
Brothers (Jama’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun).
2. Born in Mahmoudiyya, Egypt, Hassan al-Banna was the son of the prominent Imam Sheikh Ahmad al-
Banna. He studied at Al-Ahzar University and joined a Sufi order there. He then moved to Cairo as a
school teacher in 1932 establishing the Muslim Brotherhood branch there. Al-Banna was assassinated by
the Egyptian government on February 12th, 1949 as part of an Egyptian government crackdown on the
Brotherhood.
3. Sharia’h is the body of Islamic religious law. It is primarily based on the Quran and the Sunnah.
4. Hassan al-Banna, quoted in, Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (New York City:
Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 207.
5. Fereydoun Hoveryda, The Broken Crescent, (Westport, CT: Praegar Publishers, 2002), p. 56.
6. Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.
193-4.

The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Muslim Brotherhood in
Palestine. Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which
constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times. It is characterized by
its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all
Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics,
education, society, justice and judgment, the spreading of Islam, education, art,
information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam.7

Since its founding, the Muslim Brotherhood has openly sought to reassert Islam through
the establishment of Sunni Islamic governments that will rule according to the strict and
specific tenets of Shari’ah. To the Brotherhood, this is the correct primary endeavor of
human civilization, with the ultimate goal being the unification of these regimes under
the banner of the Caliphate – or universal Islamic state.

According to al-Banna, the Caliphate must govern all lands that were at one time under
the control of Muslims. He stated:
We want the Islamic flag to be hoisted once again on high, fluttering in the wind,
in all those lands that have had the good fortune to harbor Islam for a certain
period of time and where the muzzein’s call sounded in the takbirs and the tahlis.
Then fate decreed that the light of Islam be extinguished in these lands that
returned to unbelief. Thus Andalusia, Sicily, the Balkans, the Italian coast, as well
as the islands of the Mediterranean, are all of them Muslim Mediterranean
colonies and they must return to the Islamic fold. The Mediterranean Sea and the
Red Sea must once again become Muslim seas, as they once were.8 ****(doesn’t this remind you of the Zionists who want Palestine back?)
Once that is accomplished, the Caliphate is to be expanded to cover the entire globe,
erasing national boundaries under the flag of Islam. This concept was elucidated by the
Brotherhood luminary, Sayyid Qutb, who wrote in his seminal work, Milestones (1964),
that Muslims are not merely obliged to wage jihad in defense of Islamic lands, but must
wage offensive jihad in order to liberate the world from the servitude of man-made law
and governance.9 ****(Sayyid Qutb was even more insane than his predecessor, this is not what the Quran teaches)

Organizational Structure:

The Muslim Brotherhood used activism, mass communication, and sophisticated
governance to build a large support base within the lower class and professional elements
of Egyptian society. By using existing support networks built around mosques, welfare
associations, and neighborhood groups, the Brotherhood was able to educate and
indoctrinate people in an Islamic setting. The organization is headed by a Supreme Guide
or Secretary General and is assisted by a General Executive Bureau (Maktab al-Irshad),
and a constituent assembly known as the Shura Council. There have been six Secretaries
7. “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement,” The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, August
18, 1988, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm (Accessed June 9, 2008).
8. Hassan al-Banna, quoted in: Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan
(Encounter Books, 2008), p. 19.
9. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones.

General of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,10 which is widely seen as the leading
branch of the worldwide organization.

Ideology:

The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to restore the historical Caliphate and then expand its
authority over the entire world, dismantling all non-Islamic governments. The
Brotherhood aims to accomplish this through a combination of warfare – both violent and
political.
The Muslim Brotherhood has provided the ideological model for almost all modern Sunni
Islamic terrorist groups. When discussing Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, Richard Clarke – the chief counterterrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security
Council under Presidents Clinton and Bush – told a Senate committee in 2003 that “The
common link here is the extremist Muslim Brotherhood – all of these organizations are
descendants of the membership and ideology of the Muslim Brothers.”11

The leadership of Al Qaeda, from Osama bin Laden to his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri
and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed all were influenced by Muslim
Brotherhood ideology.12  ****(We know for a fact that none of the above where involved in the 9/11destruction but they were the easy target).

In fact, al-Zawahiri was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood as a young man, but he broke with them when his terrorist career began. He later wrote a book called The Bitter Harvest in which he condemned the Brotherhood for neglecting jihad in favor of participating in elections.13
The Brotherhood’s ideology was formulated by its two main luminaries: its founder,
Hassan al-Banna – who was assassinated by agents of the Egyptian government in 1949 –
and Sayyid Qutb, hanged in 1966.

Al-Banna once described the Brotherhood as, “a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi
truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an
economic company, and a social idea.”14 While studying in Cairo, al-Banna had become
immersed in the writings of Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905)
and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), who formed the backbone of the Salafiyya
Movement.15 Al-Banna agreed with their ideas that Islam provided the solution to the
afflictions plaguing Muslim society. Specifically, in accordance with Salafism, he called
for a return to what he perceived to be true Islam.
10. The six Secretaries General of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are: Hassan al-Banna (1928-1949),
Hassan Ismai’l al-Hudaybi (1951-1973), Omar al-Telmesany (1976-1986), Muhammed Hamid Abu al-Nasr
(1986-1996), Mustafa Mashour (1996-2002), Ma’amun al-Hodeiby (2002-2004), and current leader
Mohammed Mahdi Akef.
11. Statement of Richard A. Clarke before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, October 22, 2003.
12. Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, “The Muslim Brotherhood: A Moderate Islamic Alternative to
al-Qaeda or a Partner in Global Jihad?” Jerusalem Viewpoints, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
November 1, 2007. *****(This is not MODERATE ISLAM)
13. Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (Doubleday: New York, 2007), p. 116.
14. Hassan al-Banna, quoted in, Mitchell, Society of Muslim Brothers, p. 14.
15. The term Salafiyyah comes from the phrase as-salaf as-saliheen or “pious predecessors” of early the
Muslim community, referring primarily to Muhammad’s companions (sahaba).

Salafism is an austere form of Islam within the Sunni sect that attempts to return to what
its adherents believe to be unadulterated Islam as practiced by Muhammad and his
companions. In order to achieve this, Salafists strip out what they see as bida, or
innovations, from the practice of Islam as it has developed over the centuries. According
to Salafists, only pure Islam can solve the political, economic, social, domestic, and
external issues of the Muslim nation (ummah). As such, Muslim societies should be
governed according to Shari’ah.
While al-Banna drew almost exclusively on early Islamic doctrine in his works, it is also
important to understand the strong anti-colonialism sentiments driving his ideology. Al-
Banna was writing and working at a time when European powers had colonized the
Middle East.
Jihad, death, and martyrdom have been lauded throughout the history of the Brotherhood,
not only as a means to achieve the above goals, but as an end unto itself. In his seminal
work, The Society of Muslim Brothers, Robert P. Mitchell the late University of Michigan
Professor of Near Eastern History, quotes and paraphrases al-Banna:
The certainty that jihad had this physical connotation is evidenced by the
relationship always implied between it and the possibility, even the necessity, of
death and martyrdom. Death, as an important end of jihad, was extolled by
Banna in a phrase which came to be a famous part of his legacy: “the art of death”
(fann al-mawt). “Death is art” (al-mawt-fann). The Qur’an has commanded
people to love death more than life. Unless “the philosophy of the Qur’an on
death” replaces “the love of life” which has consumed Muslims, then they will
reach naught. Victory can only come with the mastery of “the art of death.” In
another place, Banna reminds his followers of a Prophetic observation: “He who
dies and has not fought [ghaza; literally: raided] and was not resolved to fight, has
died a jahiliyya [ignorance of divine guidance] death.” The movement cannot
succeed, Banna insists, without this dedicated and unqualified kind of jihad.16
Jihad is a central tenet in the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. In a booklet entitled,
“Jihad” and in other works, al-Banna clearly defines jihad as violent warfare against non-
Muslims to establish Islam as dominant across the entire world. He wrote:
Jihad is an obligation from Allah on every Muslim and cannot be ignored nor
evaded. Allah has ascribed great importance to jihad and has made the reward of
the martyrs and fighters in His way a splendid one. Only those who have acted
similarly and who have modeled themselves upon the martyrs in their
performance of jihad can join them in this reward.17  ****(WHAT he writes is absolute BS Allah forbids this kind of warfare and especially when people are unarmed, or if the believe in another religion has to be respected… Banna took this passage out of context as he always wanted to join the CRUSADERS, he was insane and the Westerners helped him along with this insanity)
To support his assertions about jihad, al-Banna quotes extensively from the Quran, the
Hadith, and great Islamic scholars. These quotes either define jihad as fighting and/or
16. Mitchell, Society of Muslim Brothers, p. 207.
17. Hassan al-Banna, “Jihad,” http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/jihad/ (Accessed June 9,
2008).
emphasize the obligatory nature of jihad. On the specific subject of “fighting with People
of the Book [Jews and Christians],”18 al-Banna quotes Quran 9:29 – the infamous sword
verse:
Fight against those who believe not in Allah nor in his Last Day, nor forbid that
which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger and those who
acknowledge not the Religion of Truth (i.e. Islam), from among the People of the
Book, until they pay the jizya [poll tax] with willing submission, and feel
themselves subdued.
Al-Banna quotes a Hanafi scholar:
Jihad linguistically means to exert one’s utmost effort in word and action; in the
Sharee’ah it is the fighting of the unbelievers, and involves all possible efforts that
are necessary to dismantle the power of the enemies of Islam including beating
them, plundering their wealth, destroying their places of worship and smashing
their idols.19 *****(exactly what the CRUSADERS DID IN THE HOLY LAND against the Muslim population is it a coincidence that Banna recites the same… I was told by my father who is a scholar on Islamic religion that at the time of the Prophet when he was fighting against the nomads who were against the religion as they believed in totems the Turks approached him and told him we will become Muslims if you allow us to fight beside you and become like the Crusaders, The Prophet refused and told them that Islam and the preaching of the Quran forbids such a thing other religions will have to pay poll tax and cannot force people to change their belief in their God as long as they believe in one God whether its Christian or Jewish they must believe in one God.)
Al-Banna continues:
Islam allows jihad and permits war until the following Qur’anic verse is fulfilled:
“We will show them Our signs in the universe, and in their own selves,
until it becomes manifest to them that this (the Qur’an) is the truth” (Surat
al-Fussilat (41), ayah 53)20
In conclusion, al-Banna writes:
My brothers! The ummah [Islamic community] that knows how to die a noble and
honourable death is granted an exalted life in this world and eternal felicity in the
next. Degradation and dishonour are the results of the love of this world and the
fear of death. Therefore prepare for jihad and be the lovers of death.21
To ensure that the Shari’ah would be the “the basis controlling the affairs of state and
society,”22 al-Banna laid out a seven-step hierarchy of goals to be implemented by the
Brotherhood for the Islamization of society. The first step is to educate and “form” the
Muslim person. From there the Muslim person would spread Islam and help “form” a
Muslim family. Muslim families would group together to form a Muslim society that
18. Al-Banna, “Jihad.”
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. “The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood” IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim Brotherhood Website
(Cached),
http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:2_Lj7AHyW7oJ

would establish a Muslim government. The government would then transform the state
into an Islamic one governed by Shari’ah, as voted by the Muslim society. This Islamic
state would then work to free “occupied” Muslim lands and unify them together under
one banner, from which Islam could be spread all over the world.
As Mitchell explains, quoting original Brotherhood sources, these goals would be carried
out in three stages. Starting with “the first stage through which all movements must pass,
the stage of ‘propaganda, communication, and information.’”23 In this stage, the
Brotherhood would recruit and indoctrinate core activists. The next stage consists of
“formation, selection, and preparation.”24 In this stage, the Brothers would endear
themselves to the population by creating charities, clinics, schools, and other services.
More importantly, they would prepare for the third and final stage: the stage of
“execution.25 Of this stage, al-Banna stated:
At the time that there will be ready, Oh ye Muslim Brothers, three hundred
battalions, each one equipped spiritually with faith and belief, intellectually with
science and learning, and physically with training and athletics, at that time you
can demand of me to plunge with you through the turbulent oceans and to rend
the skies with you and to conquer with you every obstinate tyrant. God willing, I
will do it.26
Qutb and Jahiliyya
In addition to al-Banna’s founding philosophy, the works of Sayyid Qutb (1909-1966)
also had a major impact on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Beyond that,
Qutb’s books sent shockwaves throughout the entire Islamic world. His most influential
works were Fi zilal al-Qur’an (“In the Shade of the Quran”)27 and Ma’alim fi al-Tariq
(“Milestones”). Milestones has come to be Qutb’s most popular work and has influenced
Islamic extremists such as Ayman al-Zawahiri,28 Dr. Abdullah Azzam, 29 and Osama bin
Laden.30
23. Mitchell, Society of Muslim Brothers, p. 13.
24. Risalat Al-Mu’tamar al-khamis (Message of the Fifth Congress), quoted in Mitchell, Society of Muslim
Brothers, p. 14.
25. Ibid, 15.
26. Ibid.
27. This work, written while Qutb was languishing in an Egyptian jail cell (1954-1964), is a 30 volume
commentary (tafsir) on the Quran. A highly popular work, Qutb in his commentary advocates for shari’ah
to be implemented in all Muslim societies. It also contains significant amounts of vitriol directed primarily
at Jews.
28. Zawahiri, also a member of the Brotherhood since the age of fourteen (1965) became familiar with
Qutb’s writings while he was in Saudi Arabia. There he came under the tutelage of Sayyid’s brother
Muhammad Qutb, who fled Egypt in 1972 and began teaching his brother’s philosophy while a professor at King Abdel-Aziz University in Jeddah and the Umm al-Qura University in Mecca. Osama Bin Laden also
reportedly attended Muhammad Qutb’s lectures there too.
17. Jim Landers, “Muslim Extremists Justify Violence on Way to Restoring Divine Law,” Dallas Morning
News, November 3, 2001.
30. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States

Written while Qutb was in prison in Egypt,31 Milestones’ central thesis was that the
world had degraded into a state of ignorance (as existed before the Prophethood of
Mohammad) or jahiliyya.32 He proposed that the overthrow of apostate rulers and the
establishment of Islamic societies worldwide though offensive jihad is the only way to
solve this state of affairs. In addition to Hassan al-Banna’s ideas, Qutb was heavily
influenced by the writings of Indian Islamist Sayyid Mawlana Abul Ala Maududi (1903-
1979)33 and the medieval scholar Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328).
However, Qutb expanded on their ideas of jahiliyyah and jihad.
As the 9/11 Commission Report found, Qutb came to the U.S. to study in the late 1940s:
Qutb returned with an enormous loathing of Western society and history. He
dismissed Western achievements as entirely material, arguing that Western
society possesses “nothing that will satisfy its own conscience and justify its
existence.” Three basic themes emerge from Qutb’s writings. First, he claimed
that the world was beset with barbarism, licentiousness, and unbelief (a condition
he called jahiliyya, the religious term for the period of ignorance prior to the
revelations given to the Prophet Mohammed). Qutb argued that humans can
choose only between Islam and jahiliyya. Second, he warned that more people,
including Muslims, were attracted to jahiliyya and its material comforts than to
his view of Islam; jahiliyya could therefore triumph over Islam.

Third, no middle ground exists in what Qutb conceived as a struggle between God and Satan. All
Muslims—as he defined them—therefore must take up arms in this fight. Any
Muslim who rejects his ideas is just one more nonbeliever worthy of
destruction.34
While both Maududi and Ibn Taymiyyah used jahiliyya to describe some contemporaries,
Qutb described the whole of the Muslim community to be in jahiliyya, as “the Muslim
community has long ago vanished from existence.35 Since Arab secular leaders did not
follow the Shari’ah, they were considered to be in apostasy for violating God’s
sovereignty (al-hakimiyya) on earth. In fact, “any place where the Shari’ah is not
31. Qutb spent ten years in prison from 1954 to 1964 after being arrested for being a member of the
Brotherhood (he joined in 1953) when Nasser outlawed the organization in 1954. Milestones was published when Qutb emerged from prison in 1965, even though Qutb was arrested and jailed again for preaching for an Islamic state in Egypt. He was executed on August 29th, 1966 with excerpts from Milestones used against him during his trial. After his execution he became a “Martyr” (Shaheed) to his followers.
32. Jahiliyyah can be loosely translated as a state of “ignorance of divine guidance” referring to the
conditions in pre-Islamic Arabian society before the revelations of the Quran by Allah and the Prophet
Muhammad.
33. Also written as Maududi, Maudoodi, or Mawdudi. He founded the Pakistani Islamic group Jamaat-e-
Islami in 1941 with the goal of establishing an Islamic state in South Asia. He headed the party until 1973
and was well known for his writings on Islam.
34. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton,
2004), p. 51.
35. Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones. (Syria: Damascus, Dar al-Ilm), 9.
enforced and where Islam is not dominant becomes the Abode of War (Dar-ul-Harb).”36
Jahiliyyah now included all states, whether ruled by Muslims or not.
To achieve his vision, Qutb advocated for the creation of a vanguard (tali’a), whose
members would model themselves after the Prophet Muhammad’s companions. This
vanguard would then fight jahiliyya and its influences through
methods of preaching (daw’a) and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs; and
it uses physical power and Jihad for abolishing the organizations and authorities
of the jahili system which prevents people from reforming their ideas and beliefs
but forces them to obey their erroneous ways and make them serve human lords
instead of the Almighty Lord.37
According to his vision, the vanguard would not “compromise with the practices of jahili
society, nor can we be loyal to it,” Qutb wrote. “Jahili society, because of its jahili
characteristics (described as evil and corrupt), is not worthy to be compromised with.38
Qutb’s jihad against Dar al-Harb (Abode of War),39 was not only to protect the Dar al-
Islam (Abode of Islam) but also to enhance it and spread it “throughout the earth to the
whole of mankind.”40 Adherence to Shari’ah would free mankind from the jahiliyyah
influences. This war would not be temporary, “but an eternal state, as truth and falsehood
cannot co-exist on this earth.”41

The Brotherhood Today:

While many Muslim Brotherhood branches around the world claim to have embraced
democracy, the philosophies developed by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb still carry
great influence within the organization. The Brotherhood continues to be driven by al-
Banna’s belief that Islam is destined to eventually dominate the world. The
Brotherhood’s declared principles remain steadfast even today. According to their
website, the Brotherhood seeks, “the introduction of the Islamic Shari’ah as the basis
controlling the affairs of state and society” and “unification among the Islamic countries
and states…liberating them from foreign imperialism.”42 This includes “spreading
Islamic concepts that reject submission to humiliation, and incite to fighting it” while
36. Ibid., 124.
37. Ibid., 55.
38. Ibid., 21.
39 The Dar al-Harb (Abode of War) traditionally is considered to be countries and places where Islam is
not predominant or areas not ruled by Muslims.
40. Milestones, 72.
41. Ibid., 66.
42 .“The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood” IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim Brotherhood Website
(Cached),
http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:2_Lj7AHyW7oJ:
(Accessed June 10, 2008).

“reviving the will of liberation and independence in the people, and sowing the spirit of
resistance.”43
Some have contended that there is a “moderate” wing to the Muslim Brotherhood that
can and should serve as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West, 44 but this claim
has been much disputed in academia and the media. Proponents of this theory claim that
beginning with Hassan al-Hudaybi – al-Banna’s immediate successor as Supreme Guide
– the Brotherhood took a moderate turn.
Detractors 45 note the proponents’ lack of background in the subject matter. They also cite
the Brotherhood’s persistent support of violence, under the rubric of resistance against
occupation, and the greater popularity of decidedly immoderate figures like Sayyid Qutb
over al-Hudaybi in the modern Brotherhood (Qutb’s books can be found in a variety of
languages all around the world. The same cannot be said for al-Hudaybi’s). One scholar
has questioned whether al-Hudaybi even penned the moderate volume, Preachers, Not
Judges, that has been credited to him, raising the possibility that the Egyptian intelligence
service played a role in its production.46
In the fall of 2007, the Brotherhood issued its first official platform in decades. The
platform explains, in plain terms, the agenda of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamic
world. It calls for: “Spreading and deepening the true concepts of Islam as a complete
methodology that regulates all aspects of life.” Here are some other notable excerpts
from the platform:
– “The intentions of the Islamic Shari’ah which aim for the realization of the
important aspects and needs and good achievements in the realm of religion
and spirit and the self and property and intellect and wealth represent the
ruling policy in the defining of the priorities of the goals and strategic
policies.”
– “Islam has developed an exemplary model for a state.”
– “The Islamic methodology aims to reform the state of limited capabilities to
make it into a strong Islamic state…”
Whatever moderating stance the platform takes, in August 2004, the Brotherhood issued
a public appeal of support for those fighting coalition forces in Iraq,47 and the following
43. “Reading into The Muslim Brotherhood’s Documents,” IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim Brotherhood
Website, June 13, 2007, http://www.ikhwanweb.org/Article.asp?ID=818&LevelID=2&SectionID=116
(Accessed May 29, 2008).
44. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs, March-
April 2007.
45. Douglas Farah, Youssef Ibrahim, Patrick Poole, and others.
46. Barbara Zollner, “Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s Persecution, 1954-1971” (International Journal of Muddle East Studies, 39, 2007), pp. 411–433.
47 .“The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Support of Fighting Americans Forces in Iraq,” MEMRI Special

Dispatch Series, September 3, 2004.

month, spiritual guide Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa deeming it a religious duty for
Muslims to fight America in Iraq.48
The Brotherhood also plays an active role today in promoting terrorism against American
interests. The Brotherhood actively supports Hamas to “face the U.S. and Zionist
strategy” in the Occupied Territories and supports their “legitimate resistance.”49
A November 2007 interview with Brotherhood Supreme Guide Muhammad Mahdi Akef
shows the group remains committed to violence against those it views as occupiers.
Akef, the Supreme Guide, pledged 10,000 fighters for Palestine but said it was up to a
government to arm and train them. In the same interview, Akef denied the existence of Al
Qaeda:
“All these things are American Zionist tricks,” Akef said. “The Shi’ites
attack one another, the Sunnis attack one another, and the Shi’ites attack
the Sunnis. But the Muslim Brotherhood has a principle, which I declared
from day one: The Shi’ites and Sunnis are brothers.”
[…]
“I’d like to go back to the issue of Al-Qaeda. There is no such thing as Al-
Qaeda. This is an American invention, so that they will have something to
fight for…”
Interviewer: “What about Osama bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, and the Islamic
State of Iraq?”
Akef: “When one man, or two or three, fight this tyrannical global
superpower – is it worth anything?”50
Interviewer: “Thousands have carried out attacks in the Iraq in the name of
Al-Qaeda…”
Akef: “That is a lie. Who says so?”
Interviewer: “They do.”
That argument fits with a theory offered by Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi,
senior researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs. He argues that Al Qaeda and the Brotherhood share the same final goal – the
establishment of a global Caliphate – but the Brotherhood fears “that an Al-Qaeda attack
48. “Cleric Says It’s Right to Fight U.S. Civilians in Iraq,” Reuters, September 2, 2004.
49. ”Reading into The Muslim Brotherhood’s Documents,” IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim Brotherhood
Website, June 13, 2007, http://www.ikhwanweb.org/Article.asp?ID=818&LevelID=2&SectionID=116
(Accessed May 29, 2008).
50. Special Dispatch – Jihad & Terrorism Studies Project, MEMRI TV Project, December 18, 2007.

against the West at this time might hamper the Islamic movement’s buildup and focus the
West on the threat implicit in Muslim communities.”51
Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood and spiritual guide al-Qaradawi condemned al Qaeda’s
actions in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
However, in an interview on May 23, 2008 with the online Arabic news service Elaph,52
Akef seemed to change his approach. He was asked: “Regarding resistance and jihad, do
you consider Osama Bin Laden a terrorist or an Islamic Mujahid?” In response, Akef
said, “In all certainty, a mujahid, and I have no doubt in his sincerity in resisting the
occupation, close to Allah on high.”53 He was then asked about his previous denial about
the existence of al Qaeda, and said, “The name is an American invention, but al Qaeda as
a concept and organization comes from tyranny and corruption.”
The interviewer followed with this question: “So, do you support the activities of al
Qaeda, and to what extent?” Akef said, “Yes, I support its activities against the occupiers,
and not against the people.”
Two days later, in another interview the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat,
Akef tried to clarify some of his comments about al Qaeda after receiving criticism from
religious and political leaders about his remarks in the May 23 interview. He said:
We (the Brotherhood) have nothing to do with al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden… we
are against violence except when fighting the occupier…When he [bin Laden]
fights the occupier then he is a mujahid, and when he attacks civilians, then this is
rejected. The word al Qaeda is an American illusion…Bin Laden has a thought
…his thought is based on violence, and we do not approve of violence under any
circumstances except one and that is fighting an occupier. We have nothing to do
with al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden…we condemn any thought that leads to
violence. When bin Laden fights the occupier then he is a mujahid, when he
attacks the innocent and citizens then this is rejected.54
In June 2008, Mohammad Habib, the first deputy chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood,
sat down with an interviewer from Al Ahrar, an Egyptian daily. In the long interview,
Habib spoke to the international Muslim Brotherhood:
Al-Ahrar: But what about the view that the Muslim Brotherhood will perish in
the coming twenty years?
51. Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, “The Muslim Brotherhood: A Moderate Islamic Alternative to
al-Qaeda or a Partner in Global Jihad?” Jerusalem Viewpoints, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
November 1, 2007.
52. Interview with Mohammad Akef, Elaph, May 23, 2008,
http://65.17.227.80/ElaphWeb/AkhbarKhasa/2008/5/332823.htm (Accessed May 28, 2008).
53. Ibid.
54. Abd-al-Sattar Ibrahim, “Akif tells Al-Sharq al-Awsat: The Brotherhood is Against Al-Qa’idah
Organization Targeting Civilians; Bin Ladin’s Thought is Based on Violence” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 25,
2008, FROM: BBC Monitoring International Reports.

Dr. Habib: On the contrary, I see that the future is ours, and we will reach our
aspirations. The group is gaining every day more territories and a depth in the
consciousness of the Egyptian people. Add to this, the group is not confined to
Egypt, it has offshoots in various countries all over the world, it continuously
grows, achieves more successes at all levels.
Al-Ahrar: What about the international Muslim Brotherhood?
Dr. Habib: There are entities that exist in many countries all over the world.
These entities have the same ideology, principle and objectives but they work in
different circumstances and different contexts. So, it is reasonable to have
decentralization in action so that every entity works according to its
circumstances and according to the problems it is facing and in their framework.
This actually achieves two objectives: First: It adds flexibility to movement.
Second: It focuses on action. Every entity in its own country can issue its own
decision because it is more aware of the problems, circumstances and context in
which they are working. However, there is some centralization in some issues.
These entities can have dialogue when there is a common cause that faces Arabs
or Muslims over their central issues like the Palestinian cause. At that time, all of
them must cooperate for it. I want to confirm that while some see that Palestine
caused rifts among the Arabs, we see that this cause is the one for which all Arabs
unite.55

The Brotherhood in the West

In the United States, the Brotherhood has had an active presence since the 1960s. They
have been represented by various organizations such as the Muslim Students’ Association
(MSA) founded in 1963, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) 1971, the Islamic
Society of North America (ISNA) 1981, the International Institute of Islamic Thought
(IIIT) 1981, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) 1981, the United Association for
Studies and Research (UASR) 1989, the American Muslim Council (AMC) 1990, the
Muslim American Society (MAS) 1992, the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA),
the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 1994, and others. In fact, nearly all
prominent Islamic organizations in the United States are rooted in the Muslim
Brotherhood.
An internal Brotherhood memorandum, released during the terror-support trial of the
Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) trial in July 2007 shows that
the Brotherhood’s jihad can take more subtle and long range approaches. Dated to May
22, 1991, the memo states:
The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad
in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and
55 “Interview with MB Deputy Chairman in Al Ahrar Daily,” IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim
Brotherhood Website, June 16, 2008,
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=17267&LevelID=1&SectionID=0 (Accessed June 17, 2008).

‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so
that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other
religions.56
That theme was picked up four years later by a Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a Muslim
Brotherhood spiritual leader attending a conference in Toledo, Ohio. Al-Qaradawi has
been offered the post of General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood twice, but has turned
it down in favor of building and managing several Islamist organizations in the West and
the Middle East associated with the Brotherhood.57 At the Ohio conference hosted by the
Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), he said, “Our brothers in Hamas, in Palestine,
the Islamic resistance, the Islamic Jihad, after all the rest have given up and despaired, the
movement of the Jihad brings us back to our faith.”58
He later added:
What remains, then, is to conquer Rome. The second part of the omen. “The city
of Hiraq [once emperor of Constantinople] will be conquered first,” so what
remains is to conquer Rome. This means that Islam will come back to Europe for
the third time, after it was expelled from it twice… Conquest through Da’wa
[proselytizing], that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will
conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.

But the balance of power will change, and this is what is told in the Hadith of Ibn-
Omar and the Hadith of Abu-Hurairah: “You shall continue to fight the Jews and
they will fight you, until the Muslims will kill them. And the Jew will hide behind
the stone and the tree, and the stone and the tree will say: ‘Oh servant of Allah,
Oh Muslim, this is a Jew behind me. Come and kill him!’ The resurrection will
not come before this happens.” This is a text from the good omens in which we
believe.59
Prominent Brotherhood organizations in Europe include the Forum of European Muslim
Youth and Student Organizations, the Muslim Association of Britain, the European
Council for Fatwa and Research, the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (IGD), and
the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF).
56. U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, 04-CR-240 Government exhibit 3-85.
57. Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” International Journal of
Middle East Studies (Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 385.
58. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, MAYA Conference, 1995, Toledo, Ohio.
59. Ibid.

Pentagon admits cyber shortcomings after Syrian hackers hit Army website


Pentagon admits cyber shortcomings after Syrian hackers hit Army website

Jacqueline Klimas – The Washington Times – Tuesday, June 9, 2015

A top Pentagon official said the military is failing to recruit enough cyber warriors just one day after Syrian hackers claimed that they infiltrated the Army’s official website, causing the site to be taken offline for several hours.

Brad Carson, acting under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness, said Tuesday that top cyber professionals are often eager to leave the military for the private sector where they have a much higher earning potential.

“I don’t think we are meeting our cyber goals, both with quantity or quality,” Mr. Carson said at a Defense One event at the Ritz Carlton in Pentagon City.

Speaking more broadly about the military’s ability to recruit and retain the top talent, Mr. Carson said he’d like to see the service move to a recruiting system that’s based more on quality and less on quantity. As it stands now, services must meet a specific quota of new recruits every year, but no weight is given to the quality of those recruits.

He also said he’d like to do away with the “up-or-out” promotion schedule of some military specialties. While an infantryman reaches his peak performance in his late 20s or early 30s, some technology professionals may be at the pinnacle of their career in their 40s and 50s. Despite that, the military says they must leave if they aren’t able to promote to the next pay grade.

Mr. Carson suggested that service members be promoted when they hit certain career milestones, like getting a degree, rather than after a set number of years to allow troops more flexibility in their career timeline.

Roy Wallace, the assistance deputy chief of staff for Army G-1, cautioned against catering the promotion and personnel system to fields like cyber, saying that military leaders shouldn’t forget about the infantryman sweating in temperatures well over 100 degrees at a forward operating base in the Middle East, because that skill set is crucial to the nation’s national security too.

“We need cyber guys too, because we need to know where the bad guys are,” he said. “But I also need that infantryman on the ground. It’s a delicate balance as you walk through personnel minefield we have today.”

But Mr. Carson said cyber warriors will soon play a key role in the front lines in the nation’s conflicts.

“The people at the tip of the spear are going to be in these kind of high-tech enabling missions,” he said.

While the military can’t offer compensation in line with tech giants like Google, Mr. Carson said the Defense Department should be paying some troops a more competitive salary. But he also said most who serve don’t do it for the money.

“We have to give them a good mission, we have to give them a sense that we value them, we have a plan for them,” he said. “That’s what I think people are frustrated about.” ****(or it could be that they have realised that they are not fighting the enemy but helping it, maybe they also feel betrayed I don’t think it has to do with their bureaucracy as it has to do that Pentagon military, cyber etc are assisting ISIS, ALQAEDA, NUSRA AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS… that is what they are frustrated with.)

He is set to present a plan for reform to Defense Secretary Ashton Carter in August, then spend the following year and a half implementing a new personnel system before a new administration takes over in 2017.

While many have different ideas about how the personnel system should be changed, Mr. Carson said no one is saying the 70-year-old system should be left as is.

“The time is long past due. We have a personnel system that is antiquated, that is almost Soviet in its intensity,” he said. “The rules serve a purpose, and have served a purpose, but like many things in a bureaucracy, they’ve outlived their usefulness.”

THE LIBYAN POLITICAL AGREEMENT


THE LIBYAN POLITICAL AGREEMENT

Introduction

At this critical juncture in Libya’s history, representatives from throughout the country came together to negotiate this agreement, which represents a unique opportunity to both address the immediate suffering of the Libyan people and build a democratic civil state through national consensus. In doing so they have demonstrated their commitment, as true leaders, to place the Libyan people and Libyan State above narrow self-interests and readiness to take difficult decision for the sake of Libya.

The dialogue’s political track included key players in the Libyan democratization process. The members of the House of Representatives, chosen in a free and fair election that was organized under and recognized by the General National Congress, have a responsibility to respect the democratic rights of the voters and represent their constituencies. The General National Congress managed the transitional process for more than two years, and is still of the view that it retains some role in national politics as a result of its interpretation of legal and political developments. The National Transitional Council led the country through the earliest stages of the transition. Members from all these three legislative bodies made very important contributions to the dialogue process and to the conclusion of this agreement. Other independent stakeholders participated as well. The armed groups, municipal councils, political parties, tribal leaders, and women’s organizations contributed to other elements of the dialogue to promote a genuine and stable reconciliation.

The Libyan Political Agreement that this dialogue produced rests on four main principles: ensuring the democratic rights of the Libyan people, the need for a consensual government based on the principle of the separation of powers, oversight and balance between them, as well as the need to empower state institutions like the Government of National Accord so that they can address the serious challenges ahead, respect for the Libyan judiciary and its independence.

The possibility of accepting the decision of the Supreme Court should not necessarily conflict with ensuring and safeguarding the stability of the political system and the non-occurrence of a political vacuum as per the principle of the continuity of the state based on the practice in many democracies around the world.

The implementation of this agreement in good faith will provide the tools needed to address the challenges of fighting terrorism, reforming and building state institutions, stimulating economic growth, confronting the phenomenon of illegal migration and consolidating the rule of law and human rights throughout the country.

The Libyan people will always owe their revolutionaries a debt for the part they played in the country’s liberation from decades of autocratic rule, or the sacrifices they made in their struggle for a free, democratic state that upholds the rule of law and respect for human rights The time has come to move on to a new stage in Libya’s transition, which offers the revolutionaries an opportunity to be part of a modern, professional, and reformed military under direct government control, or to be reintegrated into civilian life in a manner befitting their sacrifices. This is a time to put an end to the fighting that has crippled the country’s democratic transition and is increasingly threatening its national unity. Working for a better future for Libya should continue through peaceful means.

This agreement is the first step down a long road towards Libya’s recovery and prosperity. Political transitions are always difficult, and replacing authoritarianism with genuine democracy is a tremendous undertaking under the best of circumstances. There are no short-cuts, and it will not be easy. It is, however, a good first step that places Libya on solid ground to face the challenges ahead.

Preamble

Concurring that the peaceful settlement of the crisis in Libya requires a clear commitment and an unequivocal determination on the part of Libya’s political representatives, with the broad support of all parties, as well as the concerted and sustained efforts of all of the people of Libya, Responding to the needs of the legitimate state institutions to have clear arrangements with regards to the management of Libyan affairs until the adoption and implementation of the Libyan Constitution,

Expressing their commitment to the higher national interest of Libya and to placing it above all other priorities,
Asserting the importance of drafting a permanent constitution for Libya that achieves the ambitions and aspirations of the Libyan people towards building the state of institutions based on the rule of law and respect of human rights,

Affirming their commitment to the democratic track based on respect for the outcome of the electoral process and the principle of peaceful transfer of power,
Expressing their determination to ensure that all Libyans have the opportunity to participate effectively in state-building efforts,

Expressing their resolve to re-establish a stable environment that enjoys peace and security so as to enable state institutions to effectively meet the needs of the Libyan people and maintain their gains,
Expressing their resolve that the legitimate state authorities shall have the exclusive use of force in Libya in a manner that complies with the principle of the rule of law, Libya’s obligations under international human rights law and the rights and liberties of the Libyan people; and that security sector officials are subject to civilian oversight and accountability in accordance with the Libyan legislations in force,

Expressing their condemnation of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the targeting of civilians and civilian institutions; and their commitment to put an end to impunity,
Underscoring the important role of Libyan women in conflict prevention and resolution as well as in peace building, and the importance of their equal contribution to all efforts that aim to resolve the Libyan crisis; also, the need to increase their decision-making role in relation to those efforts and participation in the political process.

Expressing their determination to engage the youth in peace making, promote their role in the political process, and strengthen them so as to confront all forms of terrorism,
Expressing their grave concern over the growing threat posed by terrorist groups against Libya’s sovereignty, national unity, territorial integrity and democratic transition; and their total rejection of extremism and terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations and regardless of its motives,

Looking forward to building a secure and coherent society in which national reconciliation, justice, respect for human rights and freedom of expression prevail,
Expressing their commitment to preserving Libya’s independent institutions and resolve to act in the long term interests of the Libyan people with unified governance structures under a Government of National Accord, whose role is to safeguard Libya’s resources for the benefit of all Libyans, and

Reiterating Libya’s commitment to its international obligations,
The Participants in the Libyan Political Dialogue agree to the following:

(8 June 2015)

Governing Principles

This Agreement as well as its implementation and interpretation shall invoke the following principles:

  1. Commitment to the protection of the national and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its sovereignty, independence and its full control over its international borders, and rejection of any foreign intervention in Libyan internal affairs.
  2. Full commitment to the Constitutional Declaration, and to the political process that is based on the principles of democracy and peaceful transfer of power.
  3. Commitment to the respect of the principle of separation of the three powers, legislature, executive, and judicial.
  4. Commitment to the principles of the 17 February Revolution as included in the preamble of the Constitutional Declaration, and that are based on justice, equality, respect for human rights and the building of the state of law and institutions.
  5. Affirmation of the principle of equality between Libyans in terms of enjoyment of civic and political rights and equal opportunity, and rejection of any discrimination between them for whatever reason.
  6. Commitment to the principle of respect of the judiciary and its independence and ensuring its integrity and impartiality.
  7. Commitment that the House of Representatives is the only legislative authority in the country during the transitional period.
  8. Commitment to authorities and powers granted to the Government of National Accord and State Council, as well as their role in contributing to the legislative process in accordance with this Agreement.
  9. Commitment of the House of Representatives, State Council and Government of National Accord as well as other institutions that stem from this Agreement to upholding the principle of consensus during the performance of its functions and the promotion of cooperation and coordination between them in order to ensure proper conduct of the democratic process as well as integration and balance between all authorities.
  10. Full commitment to the pertinent Security Council resolutions.
  11. Commitment to the formation of a government of national accord that leadstheexecutive body and that works towards the implementation of an agreed actionprogramme.
  12. Monopoly by the State over the exclusive right to the legitimate use of force.
  13. Rejection and criminalization of all forms of violence, threat of use of violence,orincitement to use violence to achieve political goals, and the need to apply the law toanyone who incites hatred and violence.
  14. Condemnation of and combatting terrorist acts of all forms, types and funding sources,as well as commitment to the exclusive responsibility of the State for counter-terrorism, provided that it adheres to legal procedures as well as human rights law and international humanitarian law as stipulated in the relevant international agreements, conventions and standards.
  15. The state’s monopoly of the establishment of the two institutions of army and security in accordance with the law and in service to the public interest. The Army shall commit itself to the non-prejudice of the constitutional system; officers and non- commissioned officers as well as soldiers shall be prohibited from exercising political action. It shall also be prohibited for any individual, body or group to establish military or para military formations, groups or organizations outside the legitimacy of the state.

(8 June 2015)

  1. Commitment to establish and activate security institutions at the top of which are the army and police that protect the homeland and ensure the safety and security of citizens, as well as support and develop them based on Libyan legislations in force that guarantee transparency, accountability, effectiveness and professionalism, and under the supervision of the civilian authority.
  2. Commitment to the implementation of the decisions of the legislative authority concerning the disbandment of armed formations, rehabilitation of their members and their integration in civilian and military state institutions in keeping with international standards and practices.
  3. Commitment to removing all armed formations from all residential areas.
  4. Safeguarding the rights of cultural components, as they are considered an integralandfundamental component of the Libyan people, within the state of citizenship and theunifying national identity.
  5. Rejection of inciting hatred and spreading accusations of blasphemy, treason,extremism, fundamentalism and defamation as well as all forms of discrimination and contempt; and commitment to the non-use of media outlets, of all types, in committing any of such acts.
  6. Non-permissibility of detention or arrest except according to the law. Commitment to placing all prisons, detention and holding centres under the effective control of the judicial authority, and implementing Libyan laws that relate to the release of all persons held without charge or trial, and promptly and fairly bring to trial persons required for prosecution. Also, commitment to disclosing the fate of missing persons.
  7. Pursuing and punishing perpetrators of all forms of torture crimes and other forms of mistreatment against those detained, whoever they are.
  8. Activate transitional justice and national reconciliation mechanisms in order to uphold the truth and achieve accountability, reconciliation, reparation and reform of state institution, in line with the Libyan legislations in force and international standards.
  9. Total Commitment to addressing the humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons as well as facilitating their voluntary return in dignity and safety to their areas as soon as possible; also pledge providing them with protection and compensation for the damages they sustained, taking into account the financial burdens borne by the Libyan State.
  10. Commitment to work towards combatting human trafficking and illegal migration through the concerted efforts of concerned states and in close cooperation with the international community and neighbouring states, while reaffirming respect for the pertinent rules of international law.
  11. Activation of the decentralized system as a basis for local governance within the framework of the unity of the State.
  12. Commitment to the principles of transparency and anti-corruption, and adherence to international standards in the area of the State’s public contracting and in all its internal and external transactions.
  13. Recognition of the importance of the continuing independence and integrity of the economic and oversight sovereign institutions.
  14. Preservation of natural wealth, national resources as well as the state’s financial and economic institutions that belong to all Libyans, and investing them for the benefit of the people and future generations. It shall not be permissible to control or dispose of them unless by official state authorities and in accordance with the relevant Libyan legislations in force; and they shall not be made involved in any political conflict.

(8 June 2015)

Government of National Accord

Article (1)

  1. The formation of the Government of National Accord comes at a time when the country is experiencing exceptional circumstances. It derives its strength from being the culmination of the Libyan political agreement. Its success requires continued support from all parties to enable it to perform its tasks properly.
  2. The Government of National Accord shall be established on the basis of competency and equal opportunity. It shall be assigned to exercise the tasks of the executive authority. It shall consist of a Council of Ministers chaired by the Prime Minister, and the membership of two Deputy Prime Ministers and a number of ministers. Its main headquarters shall be in the capital, Tripoli and it can perform its functions from any other city.
  3. A Presidency Council for the Council of Ministers shall be established and chaired by the Prime Minister with the membership of the two Deputy Prime Ministers and two Ministers, one of whom shall be for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and Legislation Affairs, and the other shall be for Specialized Councils Affairs. Any decision shall require unanimity of the President of the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers and his two deputies.
  4. The term of the Government of National Accord shall be one year as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement. In case the formation of the new government pursuant to the Libyan Constitution is not possible during the term of the Government of National Accord, the Libyan Political Dialogue shall meet two weeks prior to the end of the term of the Government of National Accord in a session specifically convened for this purpose to consider the renewal of that term for one additional year only. In all cases, the term of the Government shall end immediately after the formation of the executive authority as per the Libyan Constitution or the expiry of its specified duration, whichever is earlier.
  5. A vote of no confidence against the Government of National Accord shall require the agreement of two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives. In this case, the dismissal shall not be valid unless with the agreement of two thirds of the members of the State Council via a decision that shall be issued within a period that does not exceed fifteen (15) days as of the date of the House of Representatives voting.Article (2)
  1. While taking into account the two principles of competency and non-discrimination, the following conditions as stipulated in the Constitutional Declaration must be fulfilled by whomever is appointed for the membership of the Government of National Accord:
    1. Must be a Libyan citizen, who enjoys civil and political rights
    2. Age upon appointment must be no less than thirty (30) years for the PrimeMinister and twenty-five (25) years for ministers.
    3. Must not hold the nationality of another state
    4. Must not be married to a non-Libyan woman
    5. Must submit a declaration that includes his movable and immovable propertiesinside and outside Libya, as well as those of his spouse and minor children.
  2. The Government of National Accord shall give the necessary consideration to the geographic dimension, cultural components and fair representation of women andyouth when selecting its members.

(8 June 2015)

  1. The assigned Prime Minister and his two deputies shall select the ministers based on a unanimous agreement between them and after convening a consultation session with members of the Libyan Political Dialogue specifically for this purpose.
  2. Annex 1 of this Agreement specifies the names of the Prime Minister as well as his two deputies and members of the Government.Article (3)

The Prime Minister, within a period that does not exceed one month of the adoption of this Agreement, shall submit a full list of the members of the Government of National Accord and its programme to the House of Representatives in order to be endorsed in accordance with the legally stated procedures within a period that does not exceed ten (10) days of its submission to the House of Representatives.

Article (4)

The resignation of the Prime Minister, his death or vacancy of his position for any reason whatsoever shall lead to the resignation of the whole Government. In this case, the outgoing government shall continue functioning as caretaker government until the formation of a new government. The Libyan Political Dialogue shall meet, in addition to five representatives for each of the House of Representatives and the State Council, in a session specifically convened for this purpose within a date no later than ten (10) days of the date on which the post became vacant in order to agree on a replacement for him. This selection shall be endorsed by the House of Representatives.

Article (5)

In case either Deputy Prime Ministers positions becomes vacant for any reason whatsoever, the Libyan Political Dialogue shall meet, in addition to five representatives for each of the House of Representatives and the State Council, in a session specifically convened for this purpose within a date no later than ten (10) days of the date on which the post became vacant in order to agree on a replacement for him. This selection shall be endorsed by the House of Representatives.

Article (6)

The Prime Minister and his two deputies may remove any minister based on their unanimous agreement, provided that the Minister continues in a caretaking capacity until the replacement is presented to the House of Representatives within ten (10) days of the removal to receive the vote of confidence.

Article (7)

The Government of National Accord shall adopt during its first meeting its own decision- making mechanisms with a two-thirds majority of its members.

Article (8)

The Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers, which comprises the Prime Minister, as well as the membership of the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the two Ministers for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and Legislation Affairs and Specialized Councils Affairs, shall have the following terms of reference:

1. Terms of Reference of the President of the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers

  1. Represent the State in its foreign relations.
  2. Accredit representatives of states and foreign bodies in Libya.

(8 June 2015)

c. Supervise the work of the Council of Ministers, and guide the Council of Ministers with regards to the performance of its terms of reference as well as preside over its meetings.

d. Issue laws endorsed by the House of Representatives within two weeks of their endorsement.

2. Terms of Reference of the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers:

  1. Assume the functions of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan army
  2. Appointment and removal of the Head of the General Intelligence Service uponthe approval of the House of Representatives.
  3. Appointment of ambassadors and representatives of Libya in internationalorganizations based on a proposal from the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
  4. Appointment and removal of senior officials.
  5. Declaration of states of emergency, war and peace, and adoption of exceptionalmeasures upon the approval of the National Defence and Security Council. The matter shall be presented to the House of Representatives for endorsement within no more than ten (10) days of its issuance.
  6. Conclude international agreements and conventions provided that they are endorsed by the House of Representatives.Article (9)

The Council of Ministers shall exercise the executive authority and ensure normal functioning of public state institutions and structures according to the following terms of reference:

  1. Establish and implement the Government programme for the duration of its term, taking into consideration the priorities stated in Annex 2 of this Agreement.
  2. Propose the necessary draft laws for performing its tasks and submit them to the House of Representatives for endorsement.
  3. Issue bylaws as well as administrative decisions and directives as required for the implementation of the Government programme in accordance with legislations in force.
  4. Manage national affairs in the interest of the country, according to laws, bylaws, regulations, and decisions in force,
  5. Prepare the draft general budget and balance sheet of the State.
  6. Develop and implement temporary emergency financial arrangements as appropriateupon conducting necessary consultation with the Central Bank of Libya, the Audit Bureau and relevant oversight authorities, according to the provisions of the financial law in force.
  7. Issue decisions regarding the structure and management of the executive bodies and institutions affiliated with the Government as it deems necessary and appropriate, and after consultation with the relevant authorities,
  8. Negotiate international conventions and agreements
  9. Implement the tasks stipulated in this Agreement.Article (10)

The Government of National Accord shall commit itself to submit a draft law upon consultation with the State Council and the National Defence and Security Council. The draft law shall specify the competencies of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army as well as the competencies of the leadership levels in the army within a period that does not exceed three months of the date of commencing its functions; it shall be presented to the House of Representatives for its endorsement.

(8 June 2015)

Article (11)

The Government of National Accord shall commit itself to the formation of a Women Support and Empowerment Unit under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

The Legislative Authority

Article (12)

The legislative authority of the State, during the transitional period, shall be undertaken by the House of Representatives, which was elected in June 2014; it shall practice its competencies based on the Constitutional Declaration and its amendment as per this Agreement.

Article (13)

The House of Representatives shall undertake the legislation authority through enacting legislations for the transitional period, granting the vote of confidence or no confidence to the Council of Ministers as per the items of this Agreement, adopting the general budget, performing oversight over the executive authority and endorsing the public policy submitted by the Government.

Article (14)

The submission of draft laws shall be initiated by no less than ten (10) members; and draft laws shall be submitted by the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister shall undertake the submission of draft laws on endorsing international conventions as well as draft financial laws.

Article (15)

  1. Governor of the Central BankofLibyaThe Libyan Political Dialogue, in addition to five representatives for each of the House of Representatives and the State Council, shall meet within sixty (60) days of the date on which the Government of National Accord is established, in a session specifically convened to deliberate on the suitable decision for:
    1. Governor of the Central Bank of Libya
    2. Head of the Audit Bureau
    3. Head of the Administrative Oversight Authority
    4. Head of the Anti-corruption Authority
    5. Head of the High National Electoral Commission
    6. The Public Prosecutor.
  2. The appointment and removal of sovereign positions indicated in the previous paragraph shall require the meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue in a sessions specifically convened for this purpose in the presence of five representatives for each of the House of Representatives and State Council so as to take the suitable decisions. Such decision shall be endorsed by the House of Representatives.Article (16)

The House of Representatives, after being joined by the boycotting members who wish to do so shall convene a session dedicated to the consideration of the following issues:

  1. The interim location for the convening of the House of Representatives.
  2. Review of the rules of procedure of the House of Representatives.

(8 June 2015)

  1. Formation of the House of Representatives’ committees.
  2. Decisions and legislations that were issued by the House of Representatives.
  3. Development of legislative work in order to promote efficiency and transparency.

Provided that action is taken on such issues no later than 30 June 2015.

Article (17)

United Nations Support Mission in Libya shall facilitate an urgent meeting between the House of Representatives and its boycotting members so as to prepare for the implementation of the previous article.

Article (18)

The term of the House of Representatives, convened as per Article 16 of this Agreement, shall continue until the end of the mandate of the Government of National Accord, or the convening of the first session of the legislative authority as per the Libyan Constitution, whichever is earlier.

The High Council of State

Article (19)

  1. The State Council shall be the highest consultative body of the State and shall carry out its work independently guided by the Constitutional Declaration and the Libyan legislations in force. It shall have legal personality and financial independence.
  2. The State Council shall express binding opinion with a qualified majority on draft laws and decisions of a legislative nature, which the Government of National Accord intends to refer to the House of Representatives.
  3. The State Council shall express advisory opinion and offer necessary proposals to the Government of National Accord in matters relating to concluding of or acceding to international agreements.
  4. The State Council must reply in writing to any request by the Government of National Accord within fourteen (14) days of the date of receiving it.Article (20)

The State Council shall organize its work based on Annex 3 of this Agreement.

Article (21)

In its first meeting, the State Council shall elect its President, two deputies and a rapporteur, and shall develop its own bylaws. The Council shall hold periodical meetings, the duration between which shall not exceed thirty (30) days.

Article (22)

  1. The main headquarters of the State Council shall be in the capital, Tripoli.
  2. The term of the State Council shall end with the end of the term of the GovernmentofNational Accord as per the text of this Agreement.Article (23)

1. The State Council shall consist of one hundred and twenty (120) members. They shall be selected via consultation among the parties participating in the Libyan Political Dialogue, provided that ninety (90) members of them are selected from among the members of the General National Congress, who were elected in July 2012 through an agreed mechanism in Annex 4 of this Agreement. The remaining members of the

(8 June 2015)

Council shall be selected from personalities, who are respected and trusted by the Libyans, and whose standing in state affairs, civil society, local and tribal community is well recognized. The selection shall take into account geographic dimension, cultural components and the representation of women and youth.

2. In case any of the State Council members’ seats becomes vacant for any reason whatsoever, the Council shall appoint a replacement during any of its subsequent meetings with the agreement of two-thirds of its members.

Article (24)

  1. The House of Representatives and State Council shall commit themselves, two months before concluding the work of the Constitution Drafting Assembly, by 24 October 2015, to establish a joint committee between them, which task shall be proposing the necessary draft laws for completing the transitional period, on top of which are the laws on referendum and general elections. The Government of National Accord shall submit such laws to the House of Representatives for endorsement.
  2. The House of Representatives, the State Council and the Government of National Accord shall commit themselves to the promotion of cooperation and coordination between them so as to provide a suitable atmosphere for the conduct of the referendum on the Constitution and the general elections, as well as the peaceful transfer of power.Article (25)

The State Council shall also be competent to examine and propose the necessary policies and recommendations for the following topics:

  1. Support to the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement.
  2. Support to national unity.
  3. Protection of the core foundations of society.
  4. Economic and social development projects according to the Government’s programmeand priorities.
  5. Combatting terrorism, extremism, violence and exclusion.
  6. Support to national reconciliation efforts and social peace through current mechanisms.
  7. Voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons.
  8. The role of media in supporting peace efforts and rejection of the culture of violenceand hatred.
  9. Support and assist fact-finding commissions and anti-corruption institutionstowardsthe conduct of their duties.Article (26)
  1. The State Council shall express its opinion in other matters on which the Government of National Accord wants to seek its advice. It may, to that end, prepare the necessary notes, studies and reports, provided that when submitting its proposals it adheres to the standards and limitations that the Government specifies for it.
  2. In order to fulfil its tasks, the Council may establish specialized committees from among its members, and may utilize the assistance of the competent and experienced Libyan experts.Article (27)

The House of Representatives shall have the right to take the opinion of the State Council in issues that it deems suitable.

(8 June 2015)

Article (28)

The Prime Minister, his deputies and ministers may attend the sessions of the State Council or one of its committees so as to express opinion in related topics.

Confidence Building Measures

Article (29)

  1. All parties to this Agreement shall work towards collecting complete information on abductees and missing persons and submit it to the Government of National Accord, which shall commit itself to establish an independent body on missing persons pursuant to the provisions of Law 1 of 2014 within sixty (60) days of commencing the performance of its tasks.
  2. All parties to the conflict shall, within thirty (30) days of the Government commencing the performance of its tasks, release persons held in their custody without legal basis or hand them over to the judicial authorities, which will determine within the following sixty (60) days whether they should be brought before the judiciary or released on the basis of Libyan legislations in force and international standards.
  3. All parties shall participate in the provision of effective protection to the competent judicial authorities and enable them to review of all detention or arrest cases and an immediate release of all persons who are held or detained without legal basis.The competent authorities shall take the necessary legal procedures in case of non- compliance with implementation.
  4. Parties to this Agreement shall commit themselves to ensure that the power to hold detainees and prisoners is exclusive to the competent judicial authorities and in officially recognized facilities as per the Libyan legislations in force.
  5. Parties to this Agreement shall commit themselves to work towards the implementation of Law 9 of 2013 on Transitional Justice, including the appointment of the Board of the Reconciliation and Fact Finding Commission within ninety (90) days of the entry into force of this Agreement.Article (30)

All parties to this Agreement shall commit themselves to cooperate with the efforts of the Government of National Accord, and the United Nations agencies as well as other relevant authorities to assist refugees and displaced persons in order to return voluntarily and safely as soon as possible to their areas. The Government of National Accord shall establish a committee to oversee this according to a suitable timetable.

Article (31)

  1. Parties to the conflict shall commit themselves to lift the siege in all besieged cities and areas.
  2. The Government of National Accord shall provide humanitarian assistance to areas and persons affected by the current conflict, while giving special attention to cities and areas that are most affected by the conflict.
  3. It shall not be permissible for any party to prevent, obstruct or otherwise interfere with the provision of humanitarian aid by the Government of National Accord, civil society institutions or international organizations.

(8 June 2015)

Article (32)

  1. It shall not be permissible for any party to this Agreement to launch or participate in any media campaign that aim to incite or promote any form of violence, hatred, or threat to civil peace and national unity for any reason whatsoever.
  2. The parties to this Agreement shall support the use of media to promote reconciliation, tolerance and national unity, and to educate the public about this Agreement.Article (33)
  1. The Government of National Accord shall have full power and control over the borders of the Libyan State, all airports, maritime ports, land crossings and all vital installations in the Libyan State.
  2. Parties to this Agreement shall affirm the need to track those who commit the crime of using force against the Government of National Accord’s control over any airport, maritime port, land crossing or other vital installation, and the need to arrest and prosecute them so as to receive penalties established by the law.
  3. All parties to this Agreement shall fully cooperate with measures taken by the Government of National Accord to open airports, maritime ports and land crossings, and to secure air, maritime, and land transportation and navigation. It shall not be permissible to any party to this Agreement to take any action intended to obstruct air, maritime, and land transportation and navigation.
  4. All parties shall commit themselves to ensure the safety of headquarters and properties that belong to the State and its different institutions and bodies, and to hand them over to it so they become under its full control.Article (34)

All Libyan, males and females, shall have the right to free movement throughout Libya, and the right to travel abroad via any of the airports, maritime ports or land crossings. No action shall be taken with the intention to restrict anyone’s freedom of movement except in accordance with the Libyan legislations in force and based on the orders of the competent judicial authorities.

Article (35)

The Government of National Accord shall continue to support the National Number System project to ensure several financial and administrative purposes, including the fair payment of salaries to Libyans in accordance with the Libyan legislations in force and without any discrimination.

Security Arrangements

Article (36)

  1. The Libyan Army is the regular military force that comprise officers, non- commissioned officers and soldiers. It undertakes defending Libya, maintaining national unity and the non-prejudice of the constitutional civil system as well as preserving public order and security when needed.
  2. The police is a civil regular body with judicial powers, tasked with maintaining peace, public order and public health as well as ensuring security, tranquility and the application of laws and regulations, in addition to combating crime before it takes place and arresting its perpetrators upon its occurrence, and protecting lives, money and properties.

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3. The Government of National Accord shall commit itself to establish and activate the security institutions at the top of which is the army and police, and to support and develop them based on professional and national bases, taking into consideration the importance of recruiting new elements who are able to enhance the capacities of the Libyan army along with the current military units and formations

Article (37)

  1. The interim security arrangements shall work towards ending the armed conflict in Libya, confronting terrorist threats, and stabilizing security in the country.
  2. The Government of National Accord shall be responsible for the implementation of the interim security arrangements, through its official bodies including the army, police and security institutions, in coordination with the National Defence and Security Council and with the support of the United Nations and the international community, while respecting the Libyan national sovereignty.
  3. The interim security arrangements shall comprise:
    1. Ceasefire arrangements,
    2. Arrangements for the withdrawal of armed formations from cities, residential areasand critical infrastructure installations.
    3. Monitoring arrangements for disarmament as well as weapons and ammunitioncantonment across the country within a specific timetable.
    4. Arrangements for confronting the terrorist threats in the country.
    5. Monitoring and verification mechanisms with regards to the aforementionedarrangements.
  4. The Government of National Accord shall undertake the power to take thenecessarymeasures in support of the stabilization of the country, as well as the implementation of the security arrangements in accordance with the agreed measures and timelines attached to this Agreement, in a manner that is consistent with the decisions issued by the legislative authority, or decisions that will be issued in the future in this regard.Article (38)

All interim security arrangements stated in this Agreement shall not restrict the efforts of the Government of National Accord aimed at combatting terrorist organizations that are classified under the relevant Security Council resolutions; such organizations include ISIS – Ansar Al Sharia and Al Qaeda.

Article (39)

  1. The Government of National Accord, upon taking the opinion of the National Defence and Security Council, shall take the necessary internal legal procedures to classify any Libyan entity as a terrorist group in accordance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law as well as the relevant Security Council resolutions.
  2. The Government of National Accord, through its different relevant institutions, including the army and police, shall take the necessary steps to combat terrorist threats in Libya that threatens the national security and social peace. This includes the adoption of the necessary plans and strategies as well as their implementation mechanisms in accordance with Libyan legislations, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as well as international resolutions on anti-terrorism.Article (40)

1. The Government of National Accord shall establish and chair the “Committee for Monitoring the Implementation of the Interim Security Arrangements” as agreed. The

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Committee shall establish sub-committees and other supporting mechanisms as may be required, taking into consideration the representation of local communities, including men and women, in such mechanisms. The Committee shall submit its periodical reports to the Government of National Accord. Until the Committee has been formed, the Security Track of the Libyan Political Dialogue shall determine suitable mechanisms to implement the security arrangements. Annex 5 of this Agreement shall specify the terms of reference of the Committee.

  1. The Government of National Accord, after consulting the House of Representatives and the State Council, shall have the right to request the necessary assistance for the Committee from the United Nations the international community.
  2. The tasks of the Committee shall include:
    1. Supervising the implementation of the ceasefire and the temporary redeployment ofarmed formations according to the agreed arrangements and timelines.
    2. Investigating reports on ceasefire violation and taking any suitable measures in thisregard.
    3. Taking the necessary decisions related to the withdrawal of armed formationsformcities, residential areas and vital installations, as well as disarmament and collectionof all weapons and ammunition.
    4. Facilitating the withdrawal of armed formations to specific assembly areas outsidecities, and monitor these areas to ensure compliance with the ceasefire plan.
    5. Facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.
    6. Taking the necessary procedures and developing the operational plans for theimplementation of this Agreement.
    7. Other necessary tasks for the Committee to perform its work.
  3. The Committee shall develop mechanisms as required to facilitate the participation of community leaders in the implementation of the ceasefire, disengagement, redeployment and disarmament. The Committee shall conduct the necessary consultations with representatives of armed formations when needed.Article (41)
  1. The comprehensive and permanent ceasefire agreement shall enter into force throughout Libya as of the date of the signing of this Agreement. The parties to the conflict shall commit themselves to immediately cease hostilities and freeze any military movement once the ceasefire enters into force. The Committee shall supervise the disengagement arrangements between the forces according to a written plan and timetable to be agreed within fourteen (14) days of the entry into force of the ceasefire. The Committee shall develop the necessary plans for the implementation of that.
  2. The ceasefire plan shall include a definition of acts that constitute a violation to the ceasefire and violations reporting mechanism as well as mechanisms for the implementation of the ceasefire plan.Article (42)
  1. Armed formations shall withdraw from all cities and residential areas, starting from the capital, Tripoli, and redeploy in specific and agreed upon locations at an agreed upon distances outside the cities, based on written plan and timetable to be agreed within thirty (30) days of the entry into force of the ceasefire, provided that the Committee develops the necessary plans for the implementation of that.
  2. The Government of National Accord shall take the necessary decisions in relation to the formation and deployment of units of the army and police units to maintain security

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and order in areas from which conflicting forces have been vacated, as well as ensure the safety and orderly functioning of the judicial authorities.

Article (43)

  1. Armed formations shall withdraw from all vital and infrastructure installations, including airports, ports, border crossings, oil installations, power plants, vital water installations, and governmental headquarters, to specific and agreed upon locations. The Government of National Accord shall assume full control over the vital and infrastructure installations according to written plan and timetable to be agreed within thirty (30) days of the entry into force of the ceasefire, provided that the Committee develops the necessary plans for the implementation of that.
  2. The Government of National Accord shall take the necessary action for the formation and deployment of units of the army and police to protect vital and infrastructure installations.Article (44)
  1. The Government of National Accord, through the army and security institutions, in accordance with the relevant procedures and laws, and in coordination with armed formations and municipal councils, as well as with the supervision and assistance of the United Nations, shall collect all heavy and medium weapons as well as related ammunition based on written plan and timetable to be agreed within sixty (60) days of the entry into force of the ceasefire. The categories of weapons and ammunition as well as storage areas for ammunition that will be cantoned and the location of cantonment shall be determined and agreed in writing, provided that the Government of National Accord specifies subsequent phases for the cantonment process and the needed timelines for their conclusion.
  2. The Government of National Accord shall, in coordination with relevant bodies, take the necessary measures to organize possession of light weapons.Article (45)

Until the decision on their disbanding has been implemented and the status of their members has been settled, all armed formations shall commit themselves to the provisions of the Libyan legislations in force, international humanitarian law and the international human rights law, especially with regards to the protection of civilians and the provision of safe passage and freedom of movement for them.

Article (46)

Upon its endorsement, the Government of National Accord shall be the one and only authorized body to import arms and ammunition in accordance with Libya’s international obligations, including the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Article (47)

The Government of National Accord shall ensure that the authority to detain or arrest persons is strictly limited to statutory law enforcement bodies, and that such authority is exercised in compliance with Libyan legislations in force, international human rights law and international humanitarian law. In all cases, no arrests or searches shall be conducted without the written warrant from a competent judicial body, except in cases of flagrant delicto, in which case the person shall be immediately referred to the competent judicial authority. No armed formation shall be granted the authority to arrest or detain persons, and the necessary legal measures shall be taken to ensure this.

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Article (48)

  1. The Government of National Accord shall work towards activating all existing laws, decisions and regulations in force and develop the necessary arrangements related to the integration and rehabilitation of members of armed formations according to a suitable timetable. It may submit new draft laws to the House of Representatives as it deems necessary and appropriate for the implementation of this purpose.
  2. The Government of National Accord shall work according to a specific timetable to account for all armed formations.
  3. The Government of National Accord shall work towards developing strategies and plans that aim to, integrate and rehabilitate members of the armed formations into civilian and military state institutions, and shall provide them with job opportunities to live in dignity within the Libyan society.
  4. Members of armed formations shall have the right to join the State’s military institutions whenever they fulfil the conditions and standards necessary for that.Article (49)

The start of implementation of the security arrangements in accordance with the stipulations of this Agreement shall coincide with the formation of the Government of National Accord.

Constitutional Process

Article (50)

The parties affirm the need to finalize the constitutional process as per its decided timelines.

Article (51)

All parties shall commit themselves to respect the independence and impartiality of the Constitution Drafting Assembly, and the Government of National Accord shall commit itself to undertake all necessary measures to guarantee the security of the Assembly and create a suitable environment that would enable it to work freely, independently, and in a manner that allows it to have unhindered access and communication with all sections of the Libyan society, inside and outside Libya.

Article (52)

The Government of National Accord shall commit itself to provide the necessary financial and logistical support to the Constitution Drafting Assembly, in order to be able to perform its duties in the best possible way and to be able to finalize a permanent constitution that is capable of articulating the ambitions and aspirations of the Libyan people.

Article (53)

All parties call on the Constitution Drafting Assembly to expedite the development and announcement of a roadmap along with a clear timetable for the remaining phases of its work, as well as work towards finding a suitable way for the Amazigh to participate in the work of the Assembly.

Article (54)

The Constitution Drafting Assembly shall commit itself to take the opinion of the House of Representatives, State Council, and the Government of National Accord on the draft constitution upon the completion of the final draft and before it is sent for referendum in a manner that does not prejudice the decided timelines for the conclusion of the constitutional

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process. The remarks of such bodies must be sent in writing to the Assembly within thirty (30) days of them receiving the draft constitution, provided that the Constitution Drafting Assembly is guided by such remarks once it prepares the final draft of the Constitution.

Article (55)

The work of the Constitution Drafting Assembly shall continue until a date no later than 24 December 2015. In case the Assembly is not able to conclude its mission by that date, the Libyan Political Dialogue shall meet, in the presence of five representatives for each of the House of Representatives and State Council and participation of the Presidency Council of the Council of Minister, at a date that does not exceed two weeks of that date to deliberate regarding this matter.

Specialized Institutions and Councils

Article (56)

The Government of National Accord shall establish a supreme council for local administration. It aims at promoting cooperation and coordination between municipal councils and the relevant competent executive authorities. The Council shall also work towards supporting the implementation of confidence building mechanisms stipulated in this Agreement and assisting the efforts of the Government of National Accord to implement the security arrangements.

Article (57)

The Government of National Accord shall establish a reconstruction commission to coordinate reconstruction efforts in areas affected by the conflict after consulting with the State Council on issues that it deems suitable.

Article (58)

Within forty five (45) days of receiving the vote of confidence, the Government of National Accord shall commit itself to submit to the House of Representatives a draft law on the terms of reference and work system of the National Defence and Security Council, while taking into account the creation of mechanisms that allow the Council to communicate with representatives of armed formations in relation to issues that concern them.

International Support

Article (59)

The Government of National Accord shall request the Security Council to issue a resolution that endorses this Agreement and supports its implementation, especially in relation to the provision of necessary international assistance to implement the security arrangements.

Article (60)

The Government of National Accord shall work with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya towards the development and adoption of a comprehensive plan for international support to the Libyan state institutions throughout the remainder of the transitional period. The Government of National Accord shall work with UNSMIL towards the coordination of international community efforts during the implementation of this plan through a mechanism adopted by the Government of National Accord, including the establishment of a specialized technical support unit, under thePresidency of the Council of Ministers, for this purpose.

Article (61)

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The Government of National Accord, in cooperation with UNSMIL, the League of Arab States and regional organizations, shall organise as soon as possible an international conference to mobilise and coordinate international support for Libya in all aspects relating to capacity- building and good governance, as well as combatting terrorism, while taking into consideration the previous outcomes of the Paris and Rome conferences on supporting Libya.

Final Provisions

Article (62)

  1. Parties to this Agreement shall commit themselves to give special priority to making the capital, Tripoli, which is the headquarters for the Government of National Accord, a safe place for all Libyans, and activate the concerned state institutions, especially the police service, so as to carry out their tasks fully to maintain security and order as per the law.
  2. Parties to the Agreement shall commit themselves to give special importance to addressing all aspects of the security situation in the city of Benghazi. The Government of National Accord shall establish a special committee for this purpose, which shall submit its recommendations on means of remedy within a period that does not exceed thirty (30) days of the Government commencing the performance of its tasks.Article (63)
  1. All parties shall commit to refraining from taking any action or decision that contradicts in any way with the items of this Agreement. They shall also work towards supporting this Agreement by all ways and means possible.
  2. All parties shall commit themselves to respecting the institutions that stem from this Agreement, including the Government of National Accord and the State Council. They shall pledge to support such institutions and not prejudice their independence or the competencies conferred on them.Article (64)

Parties to the Agreement shall give extreme priority to the need to promote cooperation and coordination between the bodies and institutions that stem from this Agreement to enhance stability, security and national reconciliation until the Constitution has been adopted, while stressing the importance of giving extreme priority to ensuring the functioning of institutions in a manner that achieves public interest. In case any of such bodies or institutions is unable to fulfil its obligations in terms of taking suitable decisions within the timelines specified in this Agreement, the parties shall commit themselves to resort to the Libyan Political Dialogue as a mechanism to resolve potential conflicts.

Article (65)

  1. The Libyan Political Dialogue shall convene after the adoption of this Agreement so as to implement the tasks intrusted to it as per the items of this Agreement.
  2. Any party to the Agreement shall have the right to request the convening of an urgent meeting to examine what it deems a severe breach to one of its items.Article (66)

The Government of National Accord shall commit itself to work towards accounting for and returning offshore Libyan funds. It shall utilize the necessary Libyan and international expertise to achieve that end.

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Article (67)

The House of Representatives shall commit itself to amend the Constitutional Declaration in accordance with the stipulations of this Agreement as per the legally stated procedures and based on the proposal submitted by the Libyan Political Dialogue in Annex 6 of this Agreement within a date that does not exceed 15 July 2015.

Article (68)

All parties shall commit themselves to the principles of international legality, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and to exclude any person, who is under investigation by the International Criminal Court or who is included in the measures specified in SCR 2174, from any official position.

Article (69)

This Agreement shall enter into force once adopted and endorsed in its entirety and signed