Washington Fights Fire With Fire in Libya How Not to End Violence in a War-Torn Land


Washington Fights Fire With Fire in Libya
How Not to End Violence in a War-Torn Land

By Nick Turse

Is the U.S. secretly training Libyan militiamen in the Canary Islands? And if not, are they planning to?

That’s what I asked a spokesman for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). “I am surprised by your mentioning the Canary Islands,” he responded by email.  “I have not heard this before, and wonder where you heard this.”

As it happens, mention of this shadowy mission on the Spanish archipelago off the northwest coast of Africa was revealed in an official briefing prepared for AFRICOM chief General David Rodriguez in the fall of 2013.  In the months since, the plan may have been permanently shelved in favor of a training mission carried out entirely in Bulgaria.  The document nonetheless highlights the U.S. military’s penchant for simple solutions to complex problems — with a well-documented potential for blowback in Africa and beyond.  It also raises serious questions about the recurring methods employed by the U.S. to stop the violence its actions helped spark in the first place.   

Ever since the U.S. helped oust dictator Muammar Gaddafi, with air and missile strikes against regime targets and major logistical and surveillance support to coalition partners, Libya has been sliding into increasing chaos.  Militias, some of them jihadist, have sprung up across the country, carving out fiefdoms while carrying out increasing numbers of assassinations and other types of attacks.  The solution seized upon by the U.S. and its allies in response to the devolving situation there: introduce yet another armed group into a country already rife with them.

 The Rise of the Militias

After Gaddafi’s fall in 2011a wide range of militias came to dominate Libya’s largest cities, filling a security vacuum left by the collapse of the old regime and providing a challenge to the new central government.  In Benghazi alone, an array of these armed groups arose.  And on September 11, 2012, that city, considered the cradle of the Libyan revolution, experienced attacks by members of the anti-Western Ansar al-Sharia, as well as other militias on the American mission and a nearby CIA facility.  During those assaults, which killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, local armed groups called on for help or which might have intervened to save lives reportedly stood aside. *****(What the author does not say that all these groups also the anti-western Ansar al-Sharia WERE TRAINED AND FINANCED BY THE UNITED STATES as a BLACKOPS AND CONTINUE TO BE FINANCED WHICH is confirmed by the today’s US Ambassador Deborah K. Jones in Libya holding the hand of one of the most extreme Muslim terrorists.   So please read the article with a pinch of salt)

Over the year that followed, the influence of the militias only continued to grow nationwide, as did the chaos that accompanied them.  In late 2013, following deadly attacks on civilians, some of these forces were chased from Libyan cities by protesters and armed bands, ceding power to what the New York Times called “an even more fractious collection of armed groups, including militias representing tribal and clan allegiances that tear at the tenuous [Libyan] sense of common citizenship.”  With the situation deteriorating, the humanitarian group Human Rights Watch documented dozens of assassinations of judges, prosecutors, and members of the state’s already weakened security forces by unidentified assailants.  *****(also the author does not mention intentionally that the Green Resistance is taking power (militias representing tribal and clan allegiances) which has been taking by storm all the cities of Libya. The only cities still trapped under the RATVERMENTS/NATO/US GOVERNMENT are Tripoli and Misurata… This of course worries the United States because when the Green Resistance arrives outside their door (US/UK/FRANCE foreign administration) they will be charged with WAR CRIMES DONE TO HUMANITY AND TO LIBYA.) 

The American solution to all of this violence: more armed men.

Fighting Fire with Fire

In November 2013, U.S. Special Operations Command chief Admiral William McRaven told an audience at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library that the United States would aid Libya by training 5,000 to 7,000 conventional troops as well as counterterrorism forces there.  “As we go forward to try and find a good way to build up the Libyan security forces so they are not run by militias, we are going to have to assume some risks,” he said.

Not long after, the Washington Post reported a request by recently ousted Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan that the U.S. train his country’s security forces.  In January, the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which coordinates sales and transfers of military equipment abroad, formally notified Congress of a Libyan request for a $600 million training package.  Its goal: to create a 6,000 to 8,000-man “general purpose force,” or GPF.

The deal would, according to an official statement, involve “services for up to 8 years for training, facilities sustainment and improvements, personnel training and training equipment, 637 M4A4 carbines and small arms ammunition, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services, Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE), and other related elements of logistical and program support.” 

In addition to the GPF effort, thousands of Libya troops are to be trained by the militaries of MoroccoTurkey, the United Kingdom, and Italy.  The Libyan Army also hopes to graduate 10,000 new troops at home annually. ***(The author forgets that these numbers are not feasible as we were 6.5 million as a nation, we have 500 thousands deaths in the last 3 years, so now we are 6 million we have 2 million in exile so now we are up to 4 million we have 1 million homeless which are mostly elderly women and men so we arrive to 3 million that is our population right now, it reminds me of the mid seventies when we were just a little over 3 million population so please Sir explain to me how are we going to have 10 thousand new troops annually with what???)

While Admiral McRaven has emphasized the importance of building up “the Libyan security forces so they are not run by militias,” many recruits for the GPF will, in fact, be drawn from these very groups.  It has also been widely reported that the new force will be trained at Novo Selo, a recently refurbished facility in Bulgaria.

The U.S. has said little else of substance on the future force.  “We are coordinating this training mission closely with our European partners and the U.N. Support Mission in Libya, who have also offered substantial security sector assistance to the Government of Libya,” a State Department official told TomDispatch by email.  “We expect this training will begin in 2014 in Bulgaria and continue over a number of years.”

There have been no reports or confirmation of the plan to also train Libyan militiamen at a facility in Spain’s Canary Islands mentioned along with Novo Selo in that Fall 2013 briefing document prepared for AFRICOM chief Rodriguez, which was obtained by TomDispatch.

Official briefing slide mentioning a U.S. military training effort in the Canary Islands.

 

Officials at the State Department say that they know nothing about this part of the program.  “I’m still looking into this, but my colleagues are not familiar with a Canary Islands component to this issue,” I was told by a State Department press officer.   AFRICOM spokesman Benjamin Benson said much the same.  “[W]e have no information regarding training of Libyan troops to be provided in the Canary Islands,” he emailed me.  After I sent him the briefing slide that mentioned the mission, however, he had a different response.  The Canary Islands training mission was, he wrote, part of an “initial concept” never actually shared with General Rodriguez, but instead “briefed to a few senior leaders in the Pentagon.”

“The information has been changed, numerous times, since the slide was drafted, and is expected to change further before any training commences,” he added, and warned me against relying on it.  He did not, however, rule out the possibility that further changes might revive the Canary Islands option and demurred from answering further questions on the subject.  A separate U.S. Army Africa document does mention that “recon” of a second training site was slated to begin last December. 

Neither the State Department nor AFRICOM explained why plans to conduct training in the Canary Islands were shelved or when that decision was made or by whom.  Benson also failed to facilitate interviews with personnel involved in the Libyan GPF training effort or with top AFRICOM commanders.  “Given the continuing developing nature of this effort, it would be inappropriate to comment further at this time, and we have not been giving interviews on the topic,” he told me.  Multiple requests to the Libyan government for information on the locations of training sites also went unanswered.   

Training Day

Wherever the training takes place, the U.S. has developed a four-phase process to “build a complete Libya security sector.” The Army’s 1st Infantry Division will serve as the “mission command element for the Libyan GPF training effort” as part of a State Department-led collaboration with the Department of Defense, according to official documents obtained by TomDispatch. 

Agreements with partner nations are to be finalized and Libyans selected for leadership positions as part of an initial stage of the process.  Then the U.S. military will begin training not only the GPF troops, but a border security force and specialized counter-terror troops.  (Recently, AFRICOM Commander David Rodriguez told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the U.S. was also helping to build up what he termed Libyan “Special Operations Forces.”)  A third phase of the program will involve developing the capacities of the Libyan ministries of justice, defense, and the interior, and strengthening Libya’s homegrown security training apparatus, before pulling back during a fourth phase that will focus on monitoring and sustaining the forces the U.S. and its allies have trained.  

 

U.S. Army Africa document details four-phase plan for U.S. training of Libyan forces.

Despite reports that training at Novo Selo will begin this spring, a State Department official told TomDispatch that detailed plans are still being finalized.  After inspecting a briefing slide titled “Libya Security Sector Phasing,” AFRICOM’S Benson told me, “I do not see us in any phase as indicated on the slide… the planning and coordination is still ongoing.”  Since then, Lolita Baldor of the Associated Press reported that, according to an unnamed Army official, a small team of U.S. soldiers has now headed for Libya to make preparations for the Bulgarian portion of the training. 

A timeline produced by U.S. Army Africa as part of a December 2013 briefing indicates that the Novo Selo site would be ready for trainers sometime last month.  After communications systems and security sensors are set up, that training range will be ready to accept its first Libyan recruits.  The timeline suggests that this could occur by early May. 

While this may have been an early version of the schedule, there’s little doubt the program will begin soon.  Baldor notes that formal Libyan approval for the training may come this month, although AFRICOM Commander David Rodriguez pointed out at a Pentagon press briefing that the Libyan government still has to ante up the funds for the program, and a Libyan official confirmed to TomDispatch that the training had yet to commence.

U.S. Army Africa timeline of U.S. training of Libyan “General Purpose Force”.

Experts have, however, already expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the program.  In late 2013, for instance, Benjamin Nickels, the academic chair for transnational threats and counterterrorism at the Department of Defense’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies, raised a number of problematic issues. These included the challenge of screening and vetting applicants from existing Libyan militias, the difficulty of incorporating various regional and tribal groups into such a force without politicizing the trainee pool; and the daunting task of then devising a way to integrate the GPF into Libya’s existing military in a situation already verging on the chaotic. 

For all their seriousness,” wrote Nickels, “these implementation difficulties pale in comparison to more serious pitfalls haunting the GPF at a conceptual level. So far, plans for the GPF appear virtually unrelated to projects of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) that are vital to Libya’s future.”  

Berny Sebe, an expert on North and West Africa at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom, noted that, while incorporating militiamen into a “mainstream security system” could help diminish the power of existing militias, it posed serious dangers as well.  “The drawback is, of course, that it can infiltrate factious elements into the very heart of the Libyan state apparatus, which could further undermine its power,” he told TomDispatch by email.  “The use of force is unavoidable to enforce the rule of law, which is regularly under threat in Libya.  However, all efforts placed in the development of a security force should go hand in hand with a clear political vision.  Failure to do so might solve the problem temporarily, but will not bring long-term peace and stability.”

In November 2013, Frederic Wehrey, a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an expert on Libyapointed out that the project seemed reasonable in the abstract, but that reality might be another matter entirely: “[T]he force’s composition, the details of its training, the extent to which Libyan civilians will oversee it, and its ability to deal with the range of threats that the country faces are all unclear.” He suggested that an underreported 2013 mission to train one Libyan unit that ended in abject failure should be viewed as a cautionary tale.

Last summer, a small contingent of U.S. Special Operations Forces set up a training camp outside of Libya’s capital, Tripoli, for an elite 100-man Libyan counter-terror force whose recruits were personally chosen by former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan.  While the Americans were holed up in their nighttime safe house, unidentified militia or “terrorist” forces twice raided the camp, guarded by the Libyan military, and looted large quantities of high-tech American equipment.  Their haul included hundreds of weapons, Glock pistols and M4 rifles among them, as well as night-vision devices and specialized lasers that can only be seen with such equipment.  As a result, the training effort was shut down and the abandoned camp was reportedly taken over by a militia.

This represented only the latest in a series of troubled U.S. assistance and training efforts in the Greater Middle East and Africa. These include scandal-plagued endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a program that produced an officer who led the coup that overthrew Mali’s elected government, and an eight-month training effort in the Democratic Republic of Congo by U.S. Special Operations forces that yielded an elite commando battalion that took part in mass rapes and other atrocities, according to a United Nations report.  And these are just the tip of the iceberg among many other sordid examples from around the world.

The Answer?

The U.S. may never train a single Libyan militiaman in the Canary Islands, but the plan to create yet one more armed group to inject into Libya’s already fractious sea of competing militias is going forward — and is fraught with peril.

For more than half a year,militia controlled the three largest ports in Libya.  Other militiamen have killed unarmed protesters.  Some have emptied whole towns of their residents.  Others work with criminal gangs, smuggling drugs, carrying out kidnappings for ransom, and engaging in human trafficking.  Still others have carried out arbitrary arrests, conducted torture, and been responsible for deaths in detention.  Armed men have also murdered foreigners, targeted Christian migrants, and fought pro-government forces.  Many have attacked other nascent state institutions.  Last month, for instance, militiamen stormed the country’s national assembly, forcing its relocation to a hotel.  (That assault was apparently triggered by a separate unidentified group, which attacked an anti-parliament sit-in, kidnapping some of the protesters.)   

Some militias have quasi-official status or are beholden to individual parliamentarians.  Others are paid by and support the rickety Libyan government.  That government is also reportedly engaging in widespread abuses, including detentions without due process and prosecutions to stifle free speech, while failing to repeal Gaddafi-era laws that, as Human Rights Watch has noted, “prescribe corporal punishment, including lashing for extramarital intercourse and slander, and amputation of limbs.”    

Most experts agree that Libya needs assistance in strengthening its central government and the rule of law.  “Unless the international community focuses on the need for urgent assistance to the justice and security systems, Libya risks the collapse of its already weak state institutions and further deterioration of human rights in the country,” Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch, said recently.  How to go about this remains, however, at best unclear.

“Our Defense Department colleagues plan to train 5,000 to 8,000 general purpose forces,” Anne Patterson, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs,told the House Armed Services Committee earlier this year, noting that the U.S. would “conduct an unprecedented vetting and screening of trainees that participate in the program.”  But Admiral William McRaven, her “Defense Department colleague,” has already admitted that some of the troops to be trained will likely not have “the most clean record.” 

In the wake of failed full-scale conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has embraced a light-footprint model of warfare, emphasizing drone technology, Special Operations forces, and above all the training of proxy troops to fight battles for America’s national security interests from Mali to Syria – and soon enough, Libya as well. 

There are, of course, no easy answers.  As Berny Sebe notes, the United States “is among the few countries in the world which have the resources necessary to undertake such a gigantic task as training the new security force of a country on the brink of civil war like Libya.”  Yet the U.S. has repeatedly suffered from poor intelligence, an inability to deal effectively with the local and regional dynamics involved in operations in the Middle East and North Africa, and massive doses of wishful thinking and poor planning.  “It is indeed a dangerous decision,” Sebe observes, “which may add further confusion to an already volatile situation.”

A failure to imagine the consequences of the last major U.S. intervention in Libya has, perhaps irreparably, fractured the country and sent it into a spiral of violence leading to the deaths of Americans, among others, while helping to destabilize neighboring nations, enhance the reach of local terror groups, and aid in the proliferation of weapons that have fueled existing regional conflicts.  Even Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Amanda Dory admitted at a recent Pentagon press briefing that the fallout from ousting Gaddafi has been “worse than would have been anticipated at the time.”  Perhaps it should be sobering as well that the initial smaller scale effort to help strengthen Libyan security forces was an abject failure that ended up enhancing, not diminishing, the power of the militias.

There may be no nation that can get things entirely right when it comes to Libya but one nation has shown an unnerving ability to get things wrong.  Whether outside of Tripoli, in Bulgaria, the Canary Islands, or elsewhere, should that country really be the one in charge of the delicate process of building a cohesive security force to combat violent, fractious armed groups?  Should it really be creating a separate force, trained far from home by foreigners, and drawn from the very militias that have destabilized Libya in the first place?

source: tomdispatch.com

 

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Libya: Global Alert is confirmed that NATO MUSTARD GAS used against civilians in Beni Walid and Sirte September 11, 2011


 

Libya: Global Alert is confirmed that NATO MUSTARD GAS used against civilians in Beni Walid and Sirte September 11, 2011

NATO commits crimes against humanity in LIBYA to respond to resistance – massacres, chemical warfare, ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate bombing and Voice of the oppressed,  September 11, 2011

Television Alrai confirms the use of mustard gas against the population of Bin Walid

According to television reports Alrai, NATO used a chemical weapon mustard gas against the Libyan population Ben Walid at 5.00 pm yesterday. Journalists in this TV channel reports that early morning, NATO ordered the renegade away from Ben Walid.

Death of a head of Al-Qaeda in Ben Walid

The news coming out of Ben Walid indicate the death of Al-Qaeda leader, Abdulrahman Abo Shnaf Mouftah. From a reliable source reports that the terrorist was killed in a battle in the Valley last night Dinar.
Also, the Renegades defeated in battle against the Libyan national army retreated to the city of Tarhuna. Later that day, NATO aircraft bombed and fired missiles, depleted uranium against the population of the city of Ben Walid.

Communication via satellite phone confirms that NATO bombings have caused many victims killed and wounded and the city is covered with clouds of smoke caused by NATO bombing.

Again NATO bombings on Sirte after a night of sound bombs.

After the great battle in the Red Valley located 90km east of the city of Sirte, the Libyan armed forces have forced the withdrawal of the renegades to Ben Jawad which is located 150km from Sirte. After ground fighting, NATO bombing began again. Having enhanced the use of sound bombs to give deaf people, NATO began attacking again. The bombs of NATO planes reach the houses of civilians. In one house they killed 7 people, six of the same family. Civilians in combat zones confirm that 36 have died renegades along with three British soldiers fighting alongside the renegade.

Taourgha, a city cleansed of its inhabitants by the renegades

Reportedly Taourgha city that is located 50km east of the city of Misrata has been completely emptied of its inhabitants by the renegades of Misrata. Note that Taourgha population are black. Renegades have slain many of the adults to terrorize others in the population of this city has been deported to another unknown place.

****Editors note: although the article is old these pictures have not circulated around the world in showing what NATO really did to Libya. Especially to Ban Walid and Sirte which in any given time the Ratverments with the NATO government do it all over again in the past three years. Babies in Ban Walid and Sirte have already been born with the side effects of the depleted uranium exactly like Iraq. The Tawergans are still kept in certain areas with barred wire and are not allowed to return home. THIS IS WHAT THE AMERICAN/NATO/EU/ISRAEL want to show us their kind of DEMOCRACY WHICH IS NOTHING MORE THAN THEIR DESPOTIC/DICTATORIAL WAY OF CONTROLLING A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY WHO DARED TO BE INDEPENDENT AND SUFFICIENT NOT NEEDING THE ROTHSCHILD’S BANKING SYSTEM, REFUSING TO JOIN AFRICOM. 

source: libia-sos.blogspot.ch

Why Was Gaddafi Overthrown?


Why Was Gaddafi Overthrown?

Video

This chaos in Libya was deliberate. It was deliberate because Libya was a stable African society in North Africa, where the leader of Libya wanted to use the resources of Libya for the reconstruction of Africa—the water resources, the oil resources, the financial resources, and the intelligence of the Libyan people.

PAUL JAY, SENIOR EDITOR, TRNN: Welcome back to The Real News Network. I’m Paul Jay in Baltimore.
March 19 will be the third anniversary of the NATO intervention into Libya.

Looking back, what were NATO’s objectives?

What Libya did they hope to find after the overthrow of Gaddafi?

And what in fact is today’s Libya?

Now joining us from Syracuse University is Professor Horace Campbell. He teaches African-American studies there and political science. He’s written extensively on African-American politics. And his new book is called Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya.
Thank you very much for joining us, Horace.

HORACE CAMPBELL, PROF. AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDIES AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, SYRACUSE UNIV.: Thank you for inviting me to discuss the failures of the U.S. foreign policy in Africa and the failure of NATO in Africa.
NOOR: So it was only a day or two ago, Navy SEAL sailors boarded a Libyan-North Korean boat carrying oil coming from a rebel-held oil port in Libya. This was, I guess, to send a message that the central government, so-called, of what is recognized by the United States, and nobody else should be selling oil. But it’s a reflection of what chaos there is in Libya. ****(what is not said by the US is that although the captured the ship they didn’t find the OIL ON BOARD)
Give us a sense now of what’s going on in Libya, and then we’ll kind of dig further back into why this all came about.
CAMPBELL: This chaos in Libya was deliberate. It was deliberate because Libya was a stable African society in North Africa, where the leader of Libya wanted to use the resources of Libya for the reconstruction of Africa—the water resources, the oil resources, the financial resources, and the intelligence of the Libyan people.
NATO intervened in spite of the differences between different sections of NATO, between France and the United States, between France and Germany, and the competition between Italy and France. Despite these differences, they came together after France precipitated this massive invasion to destroy Libyan society in 2011.
But that destruction has only created a great problem for Western capitalist forces in Africa.
JAY: I don’t quite understand why the West simply wanted to destroy Libyan society. Gaddafi’s regime was playing footsie with the IMF, with the World Bank. His sons were knocking the gavel at the stock exchange. In fact, one of his sons was visiting American military manufacturers, negotiating arms deals just before the invasion. They were doing oil and gas deals. There’s reports from the World Bank praising his reforms and privatization of the Libyan banking system. I mean, he cooperated with Bush–Cheney in many ways. He had made a big reconciliation with the Americans. I don’t understand, on the face of it, why they wanted to overthrow him. Obviously they did, but I don’t think that explains it.
CAMPBELL: That is all very true. But you’re missing one factor: that every political leader seeks political legitimacy. And in the case of Libya, the legitimacy of the leader had come from his presenting himself as someone who was part of the African Union and wanted to build an African Monetary Fund, an African Central Bank, and a African common currency. And that was a danger to not only the euro, because Sarkozy said, we’re going to fight to save the euro, but it would present a threat to the dollar. Moreover, the Libyan leadership had moved to take over the Arab banking corporation in Bahrain, and the Libyan leadership had over $200 billion in foreign reserves.
So, yes, you’re correct. They were playing footsie with the West. But that same leadership was also capable of nationalist pressures inside of Libya and inside of Africa so they could have nationalized oil companies in the midst of this global capitalist crisis. And the West did not want any surprises, where Libya would want to call on Africans to turn away from the dollar as the reserve currency and to use African resources, such as gold, as a new currency for all of Africa.
JAY: But, Horace, what evidence is there that they were really concerned about this? I know Gaddafi talked about it, but, I mean, he himself was up to the eyeballs in the World Bank. ****(see what I mean they are always mis-informed) And, you know, rhetoric is one thing, but the reality of the Libyan economy was becoming totally assimilated into global capitalism. ****(that is what the West told the rebels and they believed it. These rebels where living abroad and had no connection with the reality of Libya) It seems to me more that there was a problem is that he was also playing footsie with the Russians—
CAMPBELL: No, no, no, no, no.
JAY: —and there was more that he was caught in these inter-imperialist contradictions. I mean, you can’t tell me Libya had the power to change the currency of Africa.
CAMPBELL: They did, because Libya have $200 billion in reserves, and if Libya got five or six other African countries with massive reserves to create a common currency for Africa, which is one of the mandates of the African Union, that’s a threat to Western Europe and North America.
Moreover, the Chinese had become the dominant force in infrastructure development within Libya. There were over 36,000 Chinese involved in railway, road, water, agriculture, and other forms.
So there’s no question that Libya had the financial wherewithal to determine their own independence.
And I think one of the things that the media is missing, even those who call themselves the left, is the role thatGoldman Sachs andtheir dalliance trying to use the resources of Libya toshore up thederivatives market and thefact that they wereso involved in Libya prior to intervention.
JAY: Yeah. Well, talk a bit about that. Why was Gaddafi so involved with Goldman Sachs?
CAMPBELL: Well, that is the point. The point was that Gaddafi wanted to please the Western forces. Gaddafi’s son had studied in the London School of Economics. Gaddafi had been open to talking to this group from Boston that was going there. And all of these forces were trying to ingratiate themselves with Gaddafi, so that Gaddafi would completely be in the pockets of the West.
But he was unpredictable, and that was the problem between them and Gaddafi.
JAY: Yeah, I agree with that part. He was unpredictable. But he was very much playing ball. He was very close to the new rising Rothschild. He was playing ball with the commodity brokers. I mean, he was using the Libyan sovereign wealth fund like a private investment thing, ***(that’s absolute BS they don’t mention that with Golden Sachs we had taken them to court for misusing the funds and loosing billions which of course GS would have to return back to Libya as they court was on the side of Libya) just to—really playing with every speculator in Europe and America.
But I agree with you: he was unpredictable, and he was playing ball too much with the Chinese and with the Russians, ****(well we may played ball with China and Russia but these two countries never sanctioned us plus being deprived of any goods(from medicine, food, to everything plus a no fly zone which meant that every Libyan person had to drive to the borders of Tunis or Egypt so that they could go to Europe or anywhere else. Imagine if you need immediate attention health wise and you had to drive 700 km to reach the border wait there for over six to seven hours and then to drive to the nearest airport to conclude if someone wanted to travel to England for example he needed to be on the road for 48 hours that was one of the things we had to endure through out the embargo that the US did to Libya) from America and Europe for over ten years what did the west expect that we would lay down and die? It was the west who lost on contracts with Libya while Russia and China where wiser. For the West’s stupid decision in putting sanctions to us we made new friends and for that FUKUS destroyed everything we built.)  and that he wasn’t becoming a reliable ally in Northern Africa. That—I think that much is for sure.
But there was a lot of differences in the West about what should be done and what the objectives were.
CAMPBELL: The differences in the West stems from the fact that there is a rivalry between the European Union and the United States over the reserve currency. The entire Western world is in the midst of a global capitalist crisis since 2007, 2008, and it’s imperative that they use the military to keep forces in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe in line behind the dollar as the currency of world trade.
So in the case of Libya, Libya had the wherewithal to be playing around with the Europeans, playing around with the Chinese, and playing around with the United States of America.
JAY: But, Horace, the Chinese have—first of all, they own several trillion U.S. dollars, and I think they’ve made it very clear for at least for this historical period they are not going to challenge the U.S. dollar ****(you think, they will use it at one point or other.) as a reserve currency. Far from it. They rely on the Americans to manage this whole global system.
CAMPBELL: They rely on the United States to manage the global system, but no country in the world is happy with the United States devaluing the dollar by printing dollars, what they call quantitative easing.
JAY: Yeah, this is true.
CAMPBELL: [incompr.] $65 billion dollars every month. If the United States of America is putting $65 billion every month on the world market, nobody wants to keep their reserves in dollars. So the Chinese, the Brazilians, everybody’s looking for the exit from the dollar, because the capitalist prices means that the dollar is worthless, because if anyone can have a printing press to print dollars, then other currencies are worthless.
JAY: Okay. Then why is everybody buying American dollars? I mean, they’re getting people to buy T-bills with practically zero percent interest.
CAMPBELL: Because the American military makes it, the American dollar, a force in world politics. What backs up the American dollar today is not gold, but the U.S. military.
JAY: Yeah, but I agree with that. But all these other governments and elites rely on that.
CAMPBELL: The elites in Latin America and Africa are seeking ways to exit this, in Latin America, Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and all these countries are seeking an exit from the dollar. They’re trying to create a common currency in Latin America. In the Asian countries, they’ve created alternatives. In Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand they have created alternatives. The reality for the world is we’re living in a dangerous moment because of this capitalist crisis where the United States military is shoring up the printing of dollars and this condition in the world where the United States have unlimited access to the resources of the world.
JAY: And you think is what triggered the Libyan intervention.
CAMPBELL: This is one of the factors in the Libyan intervention. Initially the United States government was hesitant because this was a plot by the French to go into Libya. And at the outset, the secretary of defense Robert Gates and Mullen said before the Congress, do you have evidence that Libya was about to destroy their people. And the military in the United States, the United States Africa Command was originally opposed to going into Libya. But the pressures of Goldman Sachs, along with those people called the humanitarian hawks—Samantha Powers, Susan Rice, and Hillary Clinton—[incompr.] the American public and the media to go along with France and Britain for the destruction of Libya in 2011. And the people of Africa are still living with this destruction, where over 50,000 people in Africa have been killed, 40,000 people, black-skinned from Tawergha, have been thrown out of where they live. And so we have to see that initially the United States military was opposed, but later on, the media, along with Clinton, Rice, and Powers, were able to build up the psychological warfare and propaganda within this society against the United States people to portray Gaddafi as this terrible leader, when, as you said, he was in league with the Western banking and financial institutions.
JAY: Alright. Thanks very much for joining us, Horace.
CAMPBELL: Thank you very much.
JAY: And thank you for joining us on The Real News Network.
End

source: therealnews.com

A Fire at Tawerghan Refugee Camp in Janzour


A Fire at Tawerghan Refugee Camp in Janzour

Alexandra Valiente
Jamahiriya News Agency

A fire broke out at the Tawerghan refugee camp in Janzour today. It was allegedly caused by an electrical short-circuit resulting in considerable damage. Many residents are being treated by the Red Crescent for injuries and smoke inhalation.  More than 25 families are presently without shelter as a consequence of this latest disaster.

The community has still not recovered from an electrical fire that ravaged the camp on New Years day, when 18 units were destroyed and at least 12 families lost their home and everything that they owned.

The plight of the Tawergha has gone largely unreported and ignored by the world. They have been permanently barred from returning to their homes.

Please review the information in the links below for an overview of the plight of all black Libyans, including the Tawergha, as the current regime continues its racist pogrom of ethnic cleansing.

source: Jamahiriya News Agency

“Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene”


“Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene”

 

Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

September 2013

Author: Alan Kuperman, Former Research Fellow,International Security Program, 2000–2001

Belfer Center Programs or ProjectsQuarterly Journal: International Security

This policy brief is based on “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” which appears in the Summer 2013 issue of International Security.

"Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene"

In this March 2, 2011 photo, Libyan protesters burn copies of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi’s “Green Book” during a demonstration against him in Benghazi, eastern Libya.
AP Photo/ Kevin Frayer

BOTTOM LINES

• The Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong. Libya‘s 2011 uprising was never peaceful, but instead was armed and violent from the start. Muammar al-Qaddafi did not target civilians or resort to indiscriminate force. Although inspired by humanitarian impulse, NATO’s intervention did not aim mainly to protect civilians, but rather to overthrow Qaddafi‘s regime, even at the expense of increasing the harm to Libyans.

• The Intervention Backfired. NATO’s action magnified the conflict’s duration about sixfold and its death toll at least sevenfold, while also exacerbating human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbors. If Libya was a “modelintervention,” then it was a model of failure.

• Three Lessons. First, beware rebel propaganda that seeks intervention by falsely crying genocide. Second, avoid intervening on humanitarian grounds in ways that reward rebels and thus endanger civilians, unless the state is already targeting noncombatants. Third, resist the tendency of humanitarian intervention to morph into regime change, which amplifies the risk to civilians.

 

A MODEL INTERVENTION?

Many commentators have praised NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya as a humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath in that country’s second largest city, Benghazi, and helping eliminate the dictatorial regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi. These proponents accordingly claim that the intervention demonstrates how to successfully implement a humanitarian principle known as the responsibility to protect (R2P). Indeed, the top U.S. representatives to the transatlantic alliance declared that “NATO’s operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention.” A more rigorous assessment, however, reveals that NATO’s intervention backfired: it increased the duration of Libya’s civil war by about six times and its death toll by at least seven times, while also exacerbating human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbors. If this is a “model intervention,” then it is a model of failure.

FLAWED NARRATIVE

The conventional account of Libya’s conflict and NATO’s intervention is misleading in several key aspects. First, contrary to Western media reports, Qaddafi did not initiate Libya’s violence by targeting peaceful protesters. The United Nations and Amnesty International have documented that in all four Libyan cities initially consumed by civil conflict in mid-February 2011—Benghazi, Al Bayda, Tripoli, and Misurata—violence was actually initiated by the protesters. The government responded to the rebels militarily but never intentionally targeted civilians or resorted to “indiscriminate” force, as Western media claimed. Early press accounts exaggerated the death toll by a factor of ten, citing “more than 2,000 deaths” in Benghazi during the initial days of the uprising, whereas Human Rights Watch (HRW) later documented only 233 deaths across all of Libya in that period.

Further evidence that Qaddafi avoided targeting civilians comes from the Libyan city that was most consumed by the early fighting, Misurata. HRW reports that of the 949 people wounded there in the rebellion’s initial seven weeks, only 30 were women or children, meaning that Qaddafi’s forces focused narrowly on combatants. During that same period, only 257 people were killed among the city’s population of 400,000—a fraction less than 0.0006—providing additional proof that the government avoided using force indiscriminately. Moreover, Qaddafi did not perpetrate a “bloodbath” in any of the cities that his forces recaptured from rebels prior to NATO intervention—including Ajdabiya, Bani Walid, Brega, Ras Lanuf, Zawiya, and much of Misurata—so there was virtually no risk of such an outcome if he had been permitted to recapture the last rebel stronghold of Benghazi.

The conventional wisdom is also wrong in asserting that NATO’s main goal in Libya was to protect civilians. Evidence reveals that NATO’s primary aim was to overthrow Qaddafi’s regime, even at the expense of increasing the harm to Libyans. NATO attacked Libyan forces indiscriminately, including some in retreat and others in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, where they posed no threat to civilians. Moreover, NATO continued to aid the rebels even when they repeatedly rejected government cease-fire offers that could have ended the violence and spared civilians. Such military assistance included weapons, training, and covert deployment of hundreds of troops from Qatar, eventually enabling the rebels to capture and summarily execute Qaddafi and seize power in October 2011.

THE INTERVENTION BACKFIRED

The biggest misconception about NATO’s intervention is that it saved lives and benefited Libya and its neighbors. In reality, when NATO intervened in mid-March 2011, Qaddafi already had regained control of most of Libya, while the rebels were retreating rapidly toward Egypt. Thus, the conflict was about to end, barely six weeks after it started, at a toll of about 1,000 dead, including soldiers, rebels, and civilians caught in the crossfire. By intervening, NATO enabled the rebels to resume their attack, which prolonged the war for another seven months and caused at least 7,000 more deaths.

The best development in postwar Libya was the democratic election of July 2012, which brought to office a moderate, secular coalition government—a stark change from Qaddafi’s four-decade dictatorship. Other developments, however, have been less encouraging. The victorious rebels perpetrated scores of reprisal killings and expelled 30,000 mostly black residents of Tawerga on grounds that some had been “mercenaries” for Qaddafi. HRW reported in 2012 that such abuses “appear to be so widespread and systematic that they may amount to crimes against humanity.” Ironically, such racial or ethnic violence had never occurred in Qaddafi’s Libya.

Radical Islamist groups, suppressed under Qaddafi, emerged as the fiercest rebels during the war and refused to disarm or submit to government authority afterward. Their persistent threat was highlighted by the September 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues. Even more recently, in April 2013, a vehicle bomb destroyed half of the French embassy in the capital, Tripoli. In light of such insecurity, it is understandable that most Libyans responding to a postwar poll expressed nostalgia for a strong leader such as Qaddafi.

Among neighboring countries, Mali, which previously had been the region’s exceptional example of peace and democracy, has suffered the worst consequences from the intervention. After Qaddafi’s defeat, his ethnic Tuareg soldiers of Malian descent fled home and launched a rebellion in their country’s north, prompting the Malian army to overthrow the president. The rebellion soon was hijacked by local Islamist forces and al-Qaida, which together imposed sharia and declared the vast north an independent country. By December 2012, the northern half of Mali had become “the largest territory controlled by Islamic extremists in the world,” according to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa. This chaos also spurred massive displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malian civilians, which Amnesty International characterized as “Mali’s worst human rights situation in 50 years.”

Sophisticated weapons from Qaddafi’s arsenal—including up to 15,000 man-portable, surface-to-air missiles unaccounted for as of 2012—leaked to radical Islamists throughout the region. NATO’s intervention on behalf of Libya’s rebels also encouraged Syria’s formerly peaceful protesters to switch to violence in mid-2011, in hopes of attracting a similar intervention.The resulting escalation in Syria magnified that country’s killing rate by tenfold.

LESSONS

NATO’s intervention in Libya offers at least three important lessons for implementing the responsibility to protect. First, potential interveners should beware both misinformation and rebel propaganda. If Western countries had accurately perceived Libya’s initial civil conflict—as Qaddafi using discriminate force against violent tribal, regional, and radical Islamist rebels—NATO would have been much less likely to launch its counterproductive intervention.

The second lesson is that humanitarian intervention can backfire by escalating rebellion. This is because some substate groups believe that by violently provoking state retaliation, they can attract such intervention to help achieve their political objectives, including regime change. The resulting escalation, however, magnifies the threat to noncombatants before any potential intervention can protect them. Thus, the prospect of humanitarian intervention, which is intended to protect civilians, may instead imperil them via a moral hazard dynamic. To mitigate this pathology, it is essential to avoid intervening on humanitarian grounds in ways that reward rebels, unless the state is targeting noncombatants.

A final lesson is that intervention initially motivated by the desire to protect civilians is prone to expanding its objective to include regime change, even if doing so magnifies the danger to civilians, contrary to the interveners’ original intent. That is partly because intervening states, when justifying their use of force to domestic and international audiences, demonize the regime of the country they are targeting. This demonization later inhibits the interveners from considering a negotiated settlement that would permit the regime or its leaders to retain some power, which typically would be the quickest way to end the violence and protect noncombatants. Such lessons from NATO’s use of force in Libya suggest the need for considerable caution and a comprehensive exploration of alternatives when contemplating if and how to conduct humanitarian military intervention.

 

RELATED RESOURCES

Crawford, Timothy W., and Alan J. Kuperman, eds. Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion, and Civil War (New York: Routledge, 2006).

Kuperman, Alan J. “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,”International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 49–80.

Roberts, Hugh. “Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go?” London Review of Books, Vol. 33, No. 22 (November 2011), pp. 8–18.

UN Human Rights Council, nineteenth session, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A/HRC/19/68, advance unedited version, March 2, 2012.

 

Alan J. Kuperman is Associate Professor of Public Affairs in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin. During 2013–14, he will be a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, in Washington, D.C.

 

Statements and views expressed in this policy brief are solely those of the author and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

 

For more information about this publication please contact the IS Editorial Assistant at 617-495-1914.

For Academic Citation:

Kuperman, Alan. “Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene.” Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, September 2013.

 

source: belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu